Between Peace and War: The UK-Russia Threat Landscape in 2026

Key Takeaways

• The UK is unlikely to face direct war with Russia in 2026, but will remain under sustained pressure below the threshold of armed conflict.

• Russian activity against the UK and NATO is most likely to manifest through hybrid threats such as cyber attacks, sabotage, espionage and disinformation.

• Escalation risks are more likely to arise from incidents or miscalculation than from deliberate invasion or overt military action.

• NATO and the UK are hardening their defence posture, while Russia is responding asymmetrically rather than conventionally.

• Civilian infrastructure, commercial systems, and public confidence are increasingly central targets in the UK-Russia threat landscape.

The UK and Russia: What’s Going On?

The United Kingdom’s relationship with Russia has deteriorated to its lowest point in decades. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, now approaching its fourth year, serves as a volatile backdrop for UK-Russia relations. London has been one of Kyiv’s staunchest supporters, while Moscow increasingly portrays Britain and its NATO allies as hostile adversaries. The result is a multi-faceted confrontation – from heightened military posturing and nuclear sabre-rattling to cyber attacks, espionage, and propaganda campaigns – that is reshaping UK defence policy and national security planning. Direct armed conflict between the UK (or NATO) and Russia remains unlikely thanks to mutual nuclear deterrence, but the rhetoric has intensified and hybrid hostilities blur the line between peace and war. This context is a helpful backdrop for examining the current threat and risk landscape and exploring how the Kremlin’s strategic ambitions and the West’s resolve are colliding, what UK security chiefs are saying, how close we really are to war, and what kind of conflict is most probable in this perilous new era.

Russia’s War on Ukraine and Global Ambitions

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – launched in February 2022 – set the stage for today’s tensions. President Vladimir Putin allegedly aimed to overturn Ukraine’s Western alignment and reassert Russian dominance, in line with his broader revisionist, expansionist goals. However, the war has proven far costlier and longer than Moscow expected, devolving into a grinding conflict. Yet Putin appears determined to “subjugate Ukraine” and show that Russia can challenge the post-Cold War European order. Western officials describe Russia as an aggressive, revisionist power seeking to regain influence over its neighbours and undermine NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe. The head of MI6 (Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service), Blaise Metreweli, warned in her first public speech that “we all continue to face the menace of an aggressive, expansionist and revisionist Russia, seeking to subjugate Ukraine and harass NATO”.

Beyond Ukraine, Russia is positioning itself as a global competitor to the West. Putin’s regime has pursued closer ties with China, Iran, and other rivals of the US/NATO, attempting to build an alternative power bloc. In military terms, despite heavy losses in Ukraine, Russia has mobilised and adapted. Britain’s Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, noted that Russia now fields a “massive, increasingly technically sophisticated, and now highly combat-experienced, military” due to increased defence spending and hard lessons learned on the Ukrainian battlefield. In other words, the Kremlin’s hard power is still formidable and growing, even as its economy strains under sanctions. This modernised force – including advanced drones, long-range missiles, and a vast nuclear arsenal – underpins Putin’s leverage on the world stage.

Western intelligence believes Putin is content to prolong the conflict in Ukraine, betting that time and fatigue will work in Russia’s favour. “Putin [is] dragging out negotiations and shifting the cost of war on to his own population,” MI6’s Metreweli observed, underscoring Moscow’s willingness to absorb pain if it exhausts Ukraine and its supporters. As the war drags on, the strategic stakes remain high: a decisive Russian victory would shatter European security norms, while a Russian defeat could destabilise Putin’s regime. Thus, the outcome in Ukraine will heavily influence Russia’s future posture and its willingness to confront NATO or the UK elsewhere.

Russia-NATO Tensions and Flashpoints

The war has brought Russia-NATO relations to their most tense point since the Cold War’s end. Both sides have ramped up military activities and distrust is deep. NATO has expanded (Finland joined in 2023, Sweden’s accession is imminent), directly increasing Russia’s border with the alliance – a move Moscow decries as threatening. Meanwhile, NATO countries are arming Ukraine and reinforcing their own eastern defences, which the Kremlin frames as hostile encirclement.

President Putin and his top officials routinely brand NATO’s support for Ukraine as aggression against Russia. The Kremlin’s narrative is that Western nations are using Ukraine as a proxy to weaken or even destroy Russia – a claim meant to justify Russian escalation. Britain, in particular, has drawn Moscow’s ire. Sir Richard Knighton warns that “Putin’s willingness to target his neighbours ‘threatens the whole of NATO, including the UK’”, and that “the Russian leadership has made clear that it wishes to challenge, limit, divide and ultimately destroy NATO”. This stark assessment captures why NATO states feel directly threatened by Russia’s behaviour. For example, Russian forces have repeatedly probed NATO airspace and waters, leading to intercepts by British and allied jets and warships. In fact, Russian incursions into NATO airspace have doubled over the past year, according to UK defence officials. A Russian surveillance ship (Yantar) was caught operating near undersea cables off the UK just last month – the Royal Navy shadowed it after it even aimed lasers at British pilots. These incidents underscore a high-risk cat-and-mouse game along NATO’s frontiers.

In response, NATO leaders are blunt that they must be ready for worst-case scenarios. The new head of NATO, Mark Rutte, recently warned Europe “must ready itself for a confrontation with Russia on the kind of scale our grandparents and great-grandparents endured” – an ominous reference to the world wars. While that doesn’t mean war is inevitable, it reflects a recognition that Russia’s war in Ukraine could spiral into a wider conflict if mismanaged. NATO has boosted its eastern flank deployments (British troops, for instance, are exercising in Finland on Russia’s border) and drawn up new defence plans to defend every inch of allied territory. Britain’s armed forces minister confirmed the UK is “rapidly developing plans” to ready the entire country for the possible outbreak of war. During the post-Cold War lull, such comprehensive planning had lapsed – a national “war book” detailing mobilisation was shelved in the 1990s – but now officials are racing to rebuild preparedness. All of this points to extraordinary vigilance: neither side wants direct war, but miscalculation or provocation could ignite a clash if deterrence or communication fails.

Putin’s Rhetoric: Targeting the West, Especially Britain

Moscow’s confrontational stance is amplified by aggressive rhetoric from Putin and his circle, who cast the Ukraine war as a wider showdown with the West. The Kremlin’s propaganda paints NATO governments as existential enemies bent on Russia’s ruin. Increasingly, Britain has emerged as Russia’s “villain of choice” in this narrative. Russian state media and officials accuse the UK of orchestrating anti-Russian plots across the globe. Recent claims from Moscow include blaming British operatives for:

• Sabotage and Terrorism: Russia’s Foreign Ministry alleged the UK helped blow up the Nord Stream gas pipelines, plotted drone strikes on Russian airbases, and even abetted a gruesome Islamic State terror attack in Moscow – all without evidence. London flatly denies these accusations, but they serve Putin’s purpose of demonising Britain.

  
  

• Covert Operations: Russia’s FSB security service has accused British intelligence of trying to lure a Russian pilot (who flew a Kinzhal hypersonic missile jet) to defect to NATO, supposedly so the jet could be ambushed and shot down by alliance fighters. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov touted this story publicly, sneering about Britain’s inability to “wash themselves clean of it”. The UK dismissed it as fiction.

This drumbeat of allegations positions the UK as a chief instigator of Russia’s troubles. As two analysts put it, “Britain has assumed the role once reserved for the US – the Kremlin’s chief adversary and favoured bogeyman in its propaganda war”. Indeed, Russia’s SVR intelligence service declared “London today, like on the eve of both world wars, is acting as the main global warmonger”. The historical irony is not lost: Russia has long seen Britain as a crafty rival (dating back to the 19th-century “Great Game”), but during the Cold War the US was enemy number one and the UK a secondary target. Now, with Washington under a less confrontational administration toward Moscow (or possibly distracted), the Kremlin finds it expedient to single out Britain. This rhetoric rallies domestic support by claiming Russia is defending itself from Western aggression. It also seeks to intimidate European leaders by framing their support for Ukraine as tantamount to waging war on Russia.

Western leaders, for their part, have started using stark language as well – though in service of deterrence. For example, Britain’s defence chief Knighton bluntly stated that “Putin’s willingness to target neighbouring states, including their civilian populations, potentially with such novel and destructive weapons, threatens the whole of NATO”. References to “novel and destructive weapons” allude to things like hypersonic missiles or even tactical nuclear arms. In sum, the war of words is fierce: Putin portrays the conflict as Russia’s fight for survival against a scheming West, while UK and NATO officials portray it as defending the free world from an aggressive Russia. Such charged narratives carry the risk of hardening positions further, leaving less room for de-escalation.

How Close Is the UK to War with Russia?

Despite the fiery rhetoric and heightened military activity, most experts agree a direct war between Russia and the UK (or NATO) remains unlikely in the immediate term. Nuclear deterrence is a powerful brake: both Moscow and London know that an all-out conflict could escalate to nuclear exchange, which no one can win. That said, “unlikely” doesn’t mean “impossible” – and the probability of a clash has inched upward compared to a decade ago. British intelligence openly acknowledges this. Sir Richard Knighton cautioned in December 2025 that although there is “only a remote chance of a significant direct attack or invasion by Russia on the UK, that does not mean the chances are zero”.

The most plausible pathway to war would be an accident or miscalculation spiralling out of control. For instance, a Russian missile or drone could accidentally hit NATO territory. There have already been close calls: last year a Russian fighter jet dangerously fired a missile near a British surveillance plane over the Black Sea – an incident the UK MoD attributed to a technical malfunction, but illustrating how one mistake could have been fatal. Russian jets frequently test UK air defences near British airspace; Royal Air Force Typhoons scramble to intercept them. At sea, Russian submarines skulk near undersea infrastructure, and UK warships have confronted Russian vessels. Each interaction carries risk. British defence sources say Russian hostile activity below the threshold of open war – such as the spy ship Yantar near UK waters – serves as a stark reminder of the “new era of threat” where incidents could quickly escalate if misjudged.

The wider war in Ukraine could, in a worst case, spark direct NATO involvement if Russia crossed certain lines. For example, use of chemical or nuclear weapons in Ukraine, or a deliberate attack on a NATO convoy delivering aid, could trigger massive retaliation. So far, Russia has tread carefully to avoid Article 5 (the NATO mutual defence clause), even when targeting Western weapons shipments on Ukrainian soil. This implies the Kremlin does not actually seek a NATO war. Nonetheless, UK Armed Forces Chief Sir Richard Knighton has urged the nation not to be complacent. He notes that “Putin’s willingness to target his neighbours… threatens the whole of NATO, including the UK”, and emphasises that Britain must prepare for the worst even as it works to deter it. British military planners have resurrected Cold War-style civil defence concepts, and UK ministers are updating contingency plans to mobilise society if a major war loomed. It’s a sobering shift: only a few years ago, such scenarios seemed remote, but the lesson of Ukraine is that European war is not an impossibility. In short, while a direct Russia-UK shooting war is not imminent, the environment is volatile. We are one serious incident or miscalculation away from a crisis, which is why officials say “the situation is more dangerous than [we] have known… A new era for defence doesn’t just mean our military and government stepping up – it means our whole nation stepping up”.

UK Intelligence Community’s Perspective on the Russian Threat

Britain’s intelligence agencies – MI5, MI6, and GCHQ – are on the front lines of this shadow conflict, and their leaders have issued stark warnings about Russian activities. Far from the relatively static espionage of the past, Russian intelligence and its proxies are now engaged in aggressive, multifaceted operations against the UK and its allies.

MI6 (Foreign Intelligence): As mentioned, MI6 chief Blaise Metreweli used her December 2025 speech to focus almost entirely on the Russian threat, breaking with the tradition of covering a range of topics. She described a “grey zone” campaign by Moscow designed to “bully, fearmonger and manipulate” Western societies with attacks “under the threshold of all-out war”. According to MI6, these include cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, drones buzzing airports and military bases, aggressive naval activity, state-sponsored arson and sabotage, and relentless propaganda and influence operations to exploit divisions within society. Notably, Metreweli said Russia’s tactics aim to “crack open and exploit fractures within societies”, weaponising misinformation to erode public trust. A vivid example she gave was a rash of mysterious drone intrusions over northern Europe and the sighting of a Russian “research” ship (suspected spy vessel) off Scotland’s coast, coinciding with acts of sabotage on UK soil – such as a fire at an east London warehouse that was supplying aid to Ukraine. These incidents, she implied, bear the hallmarks of Russian covert action. “The export of chaos is a feature not a bug in this Russian approach,” Metreweli warned, saying we must expect such behaviour “to continue until Putin is forced to change his calculus”.

MI5 (Domestic Security): MI5 Director General Ken McCallum has likewise sounded alarms. In his annual threat update in October 2025, he revealed a 35% increase in individuals under investigation for “state threat” activity, much of it linked to Russia, China, and Iran. He said hostile states are “consistently descending into the ugly methods” once largely associated with terrorists. In other words, Russia and others are behaving more like violent extremists in their willingness to commit sabotage or violence on British soil. “Every day the UK is subject to an onslaught of cyber attacks from Russia and we know that Russian agents are seeking to conduct sabotage and have killed on our shores,” Sir Richard Knighton noted, reinforcing MI5’s point. Britain has disrupted a “stream of surveillance plots with hostile intent” coming from Russian spies. Just this year, a UK court jailed six individuals (all Bulgarian nationals) for spying on behalf of Russia, gathering information in Britain for the GRU or FSB. Separately, five men were convicted of an arson attack against a Ukraine-linked business in London – a crime British officials say was ordered by Russia’s Wagner mercenary group. McCallum vowed MI5 “will keep detecting those who take orders from Russian thugs… and follow the trails back to those giving the orders, who imagine they’re anonymous and unfindable behind their screens. They’re not”. This implies UK agencies are not only catching low-level operatives but also tracking the command structures in Moscow.

GCHQ/NCSC (Cyber Intelligence): The UK’s signals intelligence and cybersecurity arm sees Russia as arguably the most immediate cyber adversary. Richard Horne, head of the National Cyber Security Centre (part of GCHQ), warned in May 2025 of a “direct connection between Russian cyber attacks and physical threats to our security”. He explained that Russian cyber intrusions often serve as reconnaissance or enablement for real-world sabotage plots, with Moscow’s agents “waging acts of sabotage, often using criminal proxies in their plots”. In other words, a hack today might facilitate a bombing or infrastructure disruption tomorrow. Both NCSC and MI5 are seeing the cyber threat “manifesting on the streets of the UK” – meaning hackers opening doors for operatives to damage industries, businesses and critical services, “putting lives [and] national security at risk”. This played out in a series of chilling incidents across Europe: last month British police arrested a suspect allegedly working for Russian intelligence to help execute a bomb plot on a DHL logistics warehouse in Birmingham. Similarly, Russia is blamed for a July 2024 arson blaze at a DHL facility in Leipzig, Germany, and a parallel attempt in Poland. Investigators believe it was a “dry run” for a future operation to detonate bombs mid-flight on transatlantic cargo planes. Had one such device (disguised as a household item) ignited aboard a plane, it could have caused a catastrophic crash. Multiple arrests have been made across Europe, and officials directly accuse Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) of orchestrating the plot. These examples underscore hybrid tactics at work: clandestine blendings of cyber means, local agents, and industrial targets to inflict harm without open warfare.

In summary, the UK intelligence community regards Russia as a relentless and adaptive threat – using every tool from hacking and disinformation to espionage and covert violence. MI6 stresses public awareness and education (even urging schools to teach children how to spot disinformation and think critically about online content) as a first line of defence at home. MI5 is ramping up counter-espionage and working with European partners to bust spy networks and Wagner-linked cells. GCHQ is on high alert for Russian malware in critical systems. All these warnings carry a common theme: the “frontline” with Russia is no longer just in distant battlefields, but everywhere – in cyberspace, in supply chains, and even “in the minds of our citizens,” as MI6’s chief said pointedly.

What Kind of Conflict Might Erupt (and Is Already Underway)?

If tensions were to boil over, what form would a Russia–UK/NATO war likely take? The consensus among experts is that a traditional, declared war – with Russian tanks rolling westward or NATO troops fighting openly against Russians – is the least likely scenario (barring an Article 5 trigger in the Baltics, for example). Instead, the confrontation is playing out in subtler but still dangerous ways. We can envisage several dimensions of conflict:

Hybrid Warfare (Already Happening): This is the most active battlespace right now. Hybrid warfare refers to hostile actions below the threshold of formal war – and Russia excels at it. It includes cyber warfare, disinformation campaigns, economic pressure, espionage, sabotage, and proxy forces. European governments openly accuse Moscow of waging “hybrid warfare” against them, using sabotage, assassinations, cyberattacks, disinformation and other hostile acts that are often hard to trace back to Moscow. The UK is experiencing this daily: from continuous cyber intrusion attempts into everything from the power grid to NHS hospitals, to Kremlin-backed media pumping out narratives aimed at UK audiences. Cyber attacks could escalate significantly – imagine Russia crippling parts of UK critical infrastructure (power grids, communications networks, transport systems) via hacks as a form of coercion. Indeed, in 2023 the NCSC warned British businesses to brace for retaliatory Russian cyberattacks after the UK imposed new sanctions. The sabotage aspect of hybrid war is also pernicious: as discussed, plots to start fires or bomb logistics hubs are intended to instil fear and disrupt daily life without crossing the line into open military attack. Information warfare is another front: Russia will likely intensify efforts to interfere in Western democracies (for example, spreading false narratives during elections or referendums, or amplifying extremist voices to create division). MI6 highlights that “even our brains” are battlefields now, as disinformation “manipulates our understanding of each other and ourselves”. So, any “war” with Russia is most likely to be fought in the shadows – a continuation and escalation of the hybrid conflict we already see, rather than pitched battles.

A stark illustration of how these hybrid threats are already manifesting in Europe emerged in December 2025, when French authorities opened an investigation into suspected “foreign interference” aboard an international passenger ferry docked in the Mediterranean. Intelligence shared by Italian authorities revealed remote access trojan (RAT) malware on the vessel’s computer systems — software capable of giving an attacker remote control over critical systems — and two crew members were arrested on suspicion of acting on behalf of an unnamed foreign power. Although the investigation is ongoing, French officials indicated that such interference fits the pattern of state-linked hybrid activity now seen across Europe, and pointed to a country frequently associated with hostile operations against NATO allies. The episode underscores how cyber threats are evolving from data theft and espionage toward potential operational disruption of civilian infrastructure, blurring the line between criminal activity and hostile state action. Such incidents show that hostile actors no longer confine their campaigns to military or government targets: commercial transport networks and civilian systems are now in scope, raising the stakes for national and alliance preparedness.

Proxy Conflicts and External Theatres: Another form of indirect war could be via proxy conflicts. Russia might seek to hurt Western interests by igniting crises elsewhere. For instance, increased Russian meddling in the Balkans (Bosnia, Serbia/Kosovo) or the Middle East could divert NATO attention. Mercenaries or private armies like Wagner could be used to further Russian aims in unstable regions. The “frontline” is global, as MI6’s chief noted – meaning a confrontation could play out via third-party countries rather than on UK or Russian soil directly. While not directly a UK-Russia war, these proxy battles are part of the wider struggle and carry risks of escalation if Western forces or citizens are harmed by Russian proxies.

Limited Conventional Skirmishes: There is a scenario in which a limited military clash could occur without triggering full NATO-Russia war. This might involve, for example, naval incidents in contested waters (Black Sea or Baltic Sea), or a shoot-down of an aircraft. A Russian attack on a British reconnaissance drone or patrol aircraft (or vice versa) could result in a short exchange. Both sides would likely seek to de-escalate quickly to avoid all-out war, but such incidents can be a harbinger of broader conflict.

Full-Scale Conventional War: This is the nightmare scenario everyone is working to prevent. It would entail direct fighting between Russian forces and UK/NATO forces – for instance, if Russia invaded a NATO member state (the Baltic states or Poland), or if NATO intervened in Ukraine. In such a scenario, devastating air and missile strikes would likely happen within days. Russia, though bogged down in Ukraine, still fields the largest army in Europe and vast artillery and armour (and might redeploy units from elsewhere). NATO, on the other hand, has superior technology, precision weapons, and combined economic might. UK forces, alongside U.S., French, German, etc., would likely overmatch Russia’s conventional military in the long run – but not without enormous losses. Western militaries have better aircraft and naval power, and NATO’s integrated command would coordinate a defence/offense on multiple fronts. However, a full-scale war could rapidly escalate to nuclear use if Russia faced defeat. For that reason, this scenario is often described as “unthinkable,” though officials now think about it to inform their deterrence. The head of NATO’s Military Committee even urged preparing for a conflict on the scale of World War II. It’s a grim thought, and Western strategy is focused on preventing this through strength – essentially convincing the Kremlin that it could not win a NATO war, so it must not start one.

Nuclear Standoff or Limited Nuclear Use: Any direct NATO-Russia clash carries the shadow of the nuclear question. Russia’s doctrine contemplates using a tactical nuclear weapon if it is losing a conventional war (the so-called “escalate to de-escalate” concept – using a nuke to force adversaries to back off). Putin and his deputies have repeatedly rattled the nuclear sabre during the Ukraine conflict, reminding the world that Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads. The UK of course has its own nuclear deterrent (Trident submarines). The open acknowledgment that a third world war could “go nuclear” has generally kept both sides cautious. If war did break out, nuclear use would be the ultimate Rubicon, likely signalling an uncontrollable escalation. Thus, even as we ponder conventional outcomes, it must be stressed: any war between Russia and the UK/NATO could escalate to a nuclear exchange, which would be civilisation-ending. This reality underpins why so much effort is placed on deterrence and crisis management.

In practice, we are already in a kind of war with Russia – just not an open one. The UK’s armed forces chief describes it as “operating in a space between peace and war”. Russian and Western intelligence agencies and cyber units are duelling daily in secret. Propagandists battle on social media. Economic sanctions and energy supply moves are used like weapons. This state of “persistent confrontation” may well continue for the foreseeable future, absent a political breakthrough. As a result, rather than imagine tank battles, it’s more realistic to imagine cyberattacks taking out London’s power for a week, or widespread disinformation causing civil unrest, or a series of clandestine attacks on European infrastructure – these are the forms a Russia-West conflict is likely to take. They’re quieter than war, but potentially very damaging.

Military and Defence Perspectives from the UK and NATO

Facing this fraught landscape, British defence officials are rethinking strategy and resources on a grand scale. During the post-1991 era, the UK (like many NATO countries) cut defence budgets and personnel, reaping a “peace dividend.” That era is definitively over. Now, the UK and NATO are refocusing on deterrence, readiness, and resilience against high-end threats from Russia (and secondarily, an assertive China).

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton has been at the forefront of articulating changes needed. In a recent lecture at RUSI, he issued a call to arms for British society as a whole. “The whole of the UK – not just its armed forces – needs to step up to deter the threat posed by Russia of a wider war in Europe,” he said, likening the moment to the nation-wide resolve last seen at the height of the Cold War. Knighton outlined a “whole of society” effort required to bolster national defence:

• Personnel and Reserves: “More people [must be] ready to fight for their country”. This means growing the British Armed Forces (which have shrunk to their smallest size in centuries) and expanding the Reserves and cadet programs – in other words, rebuilding capacity so the UK can field and sustain larger forces if ever required. Knighton indicated an increase in reserve forces and encouraging youth towards military service or supporting roles will be important.

  
  

• Defence Industry and Supply Lines: The UK’s defence industrial base needs revitalising to ensure adequate weapons and equipment. Knighton lamented the “painfully slow” pace of private investment in defence manufacturing. War in Ukraine has shown that high-intensity conflict uses up munitions at staggering rates; Western stockpiles were strained. To address this, Knighton said “we need more people leaving schools and universities to join [the arms] industry”. He urged political and military leaders to explain the importance of defence manufacturing to the nation, and for schools and parents to encourage young people to pursue careers in engineering and technology for defence. This is a marked shift – essentially calling for talent to enter what had been a shrinking sector, so that the UK can produce enough tanks, jets, drones, and missiles for deterrence (and to supply allies).

  
  

• Public Resilience and Education: Beyond the military sphere, authorities are emphasising resilience in society. This includes hardening critical infrastructure (power grids, telecom, transport) against disruption, conducting emergency preparedness drills, and educating the public. For example, MI6 suggests schools should teach children how to spot online disinformation – making the population less vulnerable to psychological operations. Knighton similarly spoke of harnessing “all our national power, from universities to industry, the rail network to the NHS” in a national resilience mindset. The concept of an “all-in” mentality harks back to civil defence measures of the 1950s–80s, when citizens were seen as part of the defensive fabric. It’s extraordinary, but UK leaders are now candidly discussing such measures again, given the scope of the Russian threat.

  
  

• Defence Spending: The UK government has committed to raise defence and security spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, and possibly 5% by 2035 (various figures have been floated). Knighton welcomed the planned increases but hinted they may need to happen faster. As he put it, “the price of peace is increasing” – meaning Britain must invest more now to avoid paying a far higher cost if war were to break out. Currently, UK defence spending is around 2.2% of GDP, so these targets represent a major ramp-up (though over a decade). The debate in London is how quickly to implement the boosts; many in the military argue 10 years is too slow given flashing warning signs. In parallel, NATO allies are also upping their budgets – Germany, for instance, aims for 2%+ with its new €100bn fund, Poland is spending over 4% on defence, etc. This collective shift is directly attributable to Russia’s aggression and threats.

  
  

  On the alliance level, changes are also underway:

  
  

• Force Posture: NATO has increased its high-readiness forces tenfold (from a 40,000-strong quick reaction force to over 300,000 troops designated for rapid deployment) since 2022. More battlegroups are stationed in Eastern Europe. The presence of British troops in Estonia, Poland, and now training in Finland (as in the image of UK soldiers in Finland during a NATO exercise on Russia’s border) signals unity and deterrence. NATO air policing has been reinforced – RAF jets have taken rotations to guard Baltic skies, especially after incidents of Russian warplanes encroaching.

• Modernisation & Integrated Air Defence: NATO countries are rushing to modernise equipment (purchasing advanced drones, anti-tank weapons, fifth-generation jets like the F-35, etc.). A critical focus is air and missile defence, given Russia’s prolific use of missiles and drones. NATO’s chief recently called for a “400% increase in air and missile defence” across Europe. This includes systems to protect cities and bases from the kind of missile barrages Russia has unleashed on Ukraine. The UK, for example, is procuring more integrated air defence and has deployed Sky Sabre SAM systems to Poland. There is also renewed attention on anti-submarine warfare to guard undersea cables and deterrent submarines, since Russian subs have been active near Atlantic undersea infrastructure.

  
  

• Nuclear Deterrence: While not discussed openly in detail, NATO’s nuclear posture has also subtly shifted. The US, UK, and France maintain nuclear forces as the ultimate backstop. The alliance has reiterated that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” but it has also been carefully warning Russia against any nuclear use by demonstrating unity (for instance, nuclear-capable aircraft flights as signals, etc). The UK continues its program to replace its Vanguard-class submarines with new Dreadnought-class SSBNs to ensure a credible deterrent through the 2040s and beyond. This is crucial given Putin’s threats – maintaining nuclear deterrence is what underwrites all other defence efforts.

In the military balance, if (hypothetically) a war did occur, NATO enjoys significant advantages in technology, networked warfare, and economic depth. Russia, however, has a large standing force and the edge of operating on interior lines (i.e. geographically contiguous to the conflict zone, if in Eastern Europe). Knighton’s observation that Russia’s military is now “highly combat-experienced” is a double-edged sword: their troops and officers have learned hard lessons in Ukraine (urban combat, drone tactics, electronic warfare), but they are also worn down to an extent by casualties and morale issues. The UK and allies, by contrast, are re-learning to fight a peer adversary by studying the Ukraine war and conducting intensive exercises. Ultimately, NATO’s strategy is to be so prepared and strong that war never happens – the classic deterrence model. As Knighton stated plainly: “Our objective must be to avoid war, but the price of maintaining peace is rising.”  This encapsulates the current approach – invest and gird now, to deter Russia from any temptation of direct aggression.

Who Would Win a War Between Russia and the UK?

It’s a question one hopes never to see answered. In a full-blown war pitting Russia against the UK and its NATO allies, the consensus is that no one “wins” – the consequences would be catastrophic for all sides. Any conflict of that magnitude would risk going nuclear, in which case both countries (and much of the world) would suffer unacceptable devastation. As such, war planners focus on preventing such an outcome rather than “winning” it.

That said, examining relative strengths in a conventional-only scenario is instructive. Were Russia to somehow engage in a limited conventional war with the UK (and presumably NATO), NATO’s collective power vastly exceeds Russia’s in most metrics. NATO Europe alone outspends Russia many times over on defence, and with the US and Canada included, the alliance’s military expenditure is roughly 15 times Russia’s. The UK by itself has a smaller active military vs Russia’s – but the UK would never fight alone; by treaty, an attack on one NATO member brings the rest. In any localised clash (say in Eastern Europe), NATO’s air superiority would likely be decisive. The alliance has hundreds of fourth and fifth generation fighter jets (RAF Typhoons and F-35s among them) that outclass most of Russia’s fleet. NATO also has greater precision-strike capabilities (cruise missiles, drones, etc) and more advanced surveillance and targeting (e.g. satellites).

On land, Russian ground forces are numerically large and stocked with tanks and artillery, but we’ve seen in Ukraine that superior tactics and technology (backed by Western intelligence) can defeat larger Russian formations. A direct Russia-vs-NATO clash would pit battle-hardened Russian units against NATO units that, while not bloodied in Ukraine, are highly trained and now better equipped (thanks to lessons learned and production ramp-ups). For example, Britain’s Army is small but professional; it has sent much of its older kit (like Challenger 2 tanks) to help Ukraine, and is upgrading to Challenger 3s. In a war scenario, it’s expected that NATO forces would coordinate closely, leveraging each nation’s strengths (e.g. US logistics and heavy bombers, British intelligence and special forces, French and Polish heavy armour, etc). One British military analyst noted that “our armed forces always need to be ready to fight and win – that’s why readiness is such a priority”. This underscores that NATO believes it could win a conventional war – otherwise deterrence would ring hollow.

However, winning might come at enormous cost. As Knighton grimly pointed out, “the war in Ukraine shows that Putin’s willingness to target neighbouring states, including their civilian populations, potentially with novel and destructive weapons, threatens the whole of NATO”. Russia has shown it would bombard cities and infrastructure ruthlessly. If war expanded, the UK could come under heavy missile fire (Russia has long-range missiles that could strike UK targets, though NATO missile defences would try to intercept many). The British homeland, for the first time since the 1980s, is being seriously included in defence planning (for instance, how to disperse critical industries, how to shelter civilians if needed). So even in a scenario where NATO prevails militarily, the UK could suffer greatly from strikes on bases or cyber attacks on power grids, etc.

And looming above all is the nuclear factor. This mutual deterrence is why any rational calculation says there can be no “winner” in a full war – it must be avoided. Both Moscow and London know a nuclear exchange would be suicide. During the Cold War, this led to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) which successfully prevented direct conflict. That logic still holds, though we worry about misjudgment.

In sum, if constrained to non-nuclear means, NATO (including the UK) would likely defeat Russia militarily over time, given its overwhelming superiority in resources and technology. But Russia could inflict horrific damage in the process, and a swift, decisive victory is far from guaranteed. No serious leader in London or Moscow truly believes such a war could yield a meaningful victory – which is why the emphasis is on strong deterrence to maintain peace. As Sir Richard Knighton said, avoiding war is paramount, even if preparing for it is necessary: “Our objective must be to avoid war, but the price of maintaining peace is rising”. The real “win” is to navigate this confrontation without triggering open war at all.

Implications and the Road Ahead for the UK and NATO

The current UK-Russia standoff has far-reaching implications for national security, foreign policy, and everyday life in Britain. Some key takeaways and future considerations include:

• Return to an Era of Vigilance: Britain and Europe have entered a period reminiscent of the Cold War in terms of vigilance. The head of MI6 observed that the world is “more dangerous and contested now than it has been for decades”. The “age of uncertainty” she and others describe means the UK must plan for complex threats, not the relatively static threats of the war on terror era. Society may see a greater emphasis on security – from more armed forces recruitment drives, to awareness campaigns in schools, to possible revival of civil defence practices (like public guidance on what to do in various emergency scenarios). The Armed Forces Chief explicitly noted echoes of the Cold War in calling the whole nation to step up, invoking how society was mobilised against the Soviet nuclear threat in the 20th century.

  
  

• Strengthening NATO & Alliances: One clear implication is that NATO has regained centrality in European security. The alliance is expanding (with Finland and Sweden’s membership) rather than shrinking, directly countering Putin’s goal of a divided West. The UK will continue to work through NATO – investing in joint defence projects, forward-deploying troops to allied territory, and supporting countries like Poland and the Baltic states which feel most threatened. At NATO summits, the UK is likely to push for even stronger collective defences (as indicated by its support for measures like enhanced air defence and higher spending commitments). Additionally, partnerships like the AUKUS pact (with the US and Australia) and closer ties with non-NATO partners (Japan, etc.) are part of a global network to counter authoritarian threats. The Russia challenge has also drawn the UK and EU closer on security; intelligence sharing with European neighbours has increased in light of Russian spy and sabotage activity.

  
  

• Deterrence with Dialogue: While deterrence is the priority, Western leaders leave room for diplomacy. At some point, the war in Ukraine will require a political resolution. When that time comes, UK-Russia relations might enter a new phase – perhaps a cold peace with ongoing rivalry but some guarded engagement on arms control or incident prevention. Right now, though, formal dialogue channels are minimal (Russia has cut off many bilateral contacts). The risk is misinterpretation; thus some experts urge re-establishing military hotlines to avoid accidents. The challenge will be finding balance between standing firm (so Russia cannot bully its neighbours) and avoiding provocation that could feed Putin’s narrative or corner him dangerously.

  
  

• Continuous Hybrid Threats: British security services anticipate that Russian hybrid threats will persist or even increase irrespective of what happens in Ukraine. If Putin’s regime remains in power, it will likely continue trying to “export chaos” as a means of undermining adversaries. This means the UK’s counter-intelligence, counter-cyber, and counter-disinformation efforts must be long-term. The general public may see more frequent alerts (for example, advisories to be vigilant about phishing emails targeting critical industries, or calls to report suspicious drone activity near infrastructure). As MI6 highlighted, “the frontline is everywhere” now, implying that national resilience depends on ordinary citizens as well – whether that’s practicing good cyber hygiene or resisting the lure of fake news that aims to divide communities.

  
  

• Economic and Energy Security: Another implication is the re-thinking of economic ties and energy security. Europe has largely weaned itself off Russian energy since the war, bolstering national resilience. The UK had relatively low dependence on Russian gas, but still took measures to diversify oil supply and support allies in doing so. Conversely, sanctions on Russia and the risk of Russian retaliation mean UK businesses must account for geopolitical risk. The ferry malware case in France, for example, raised concerns about shipping and port security. Companies are now part of the security equation – hence the push for private sector involvement in defence, both in terms of innovation (e.g. cybersecurity startups, defence tech) and security compliance (hardening their systems).

  
  

• Who Leads Russia Next?: Looking forward, much depends on Russia’s internal trajectory. Putin has positioned himself as a wartime leader fighting the West; as long as he or a like-minded successor is in power, one can expect adversarial relations to persist. There is an off-chance that change within Russia – whether via public pressure or elite dynamics – could eventually bring a more pragmatic leadership that de-escalates tensions. The UK must be prepared for either scenario: more confrontation, or an opportunity for guarded reconciliation. It will calibrate its policies accordingly, but not at the expense of Ukraine’s security or NATO unity.

  
  

• Supporting Ukraine to Conclusion: In the near term, the UK’s resolve to support Ukraine militarily and economically remains firm. Officials from MI6 to the Prime Minister have signalled that British aid to Ukraine will “endure” as long as needed. They see this as critical not only morally (to help a sovereign nation under attack) but strategically – a Ukraine that withstands Russia sets a precedent that aggression doesn’t pay, which bolsters global security. Conversely, if Russia were allowed to conquer Ukraine, it could embolden Moscow toward further belligerence. Thus, the outcome in Ukraine will heavily influence European security: a stabilised Ukraine (ideally in some association with NATO/EU) would be a bulwark against Russian expansion; a protracted conflict or frozen front could mean enduring instability.

What does this mean for 2026?

Looking ahead to 2026, the UK is unlikely to find itself in a declared, conventional war with Russia. However, it is equally unlikely to experience a return to anything resembling “normal” peacetime relations. Instead, the most realistic outlook is one of persistent confrontation below the threshold of war, characterised by hybrid threats, coercive pressure, and elevated national security risk.

Senior UK defence and intelligence figures are increasingly explicit that Britain is operating in a space “between peace and war”, where hostile activity is constant, deniable and designed to test resilience rather than provoke immediate military retaliation. This framing is critical for understanding what 2026 is likely to bring.

By 2026, Russia’s campaign against the UK and its allies is most likely to remain hybrid by design. Even if the intensity of fighting in Ukraine changes, UK intelligence indicates that Russian hostile activity against NATO states will persist because it is low-cost, scalable, and politically useful to the Kremlin. Hybrid activity allows Moscow to apply pressure without triggering NATO’s collective defence mechanisms, maintain plausible deniability, and exploit social, political and economic vulnerabilities inside adversary states.

For the UK, this means 2026 is likely to feature continued cyber operations, sabotage attempts, espionage activity and influence operations, rather than overt military confrontation. The intent is not necessarily to defeat the UK militarily, but to raise the cost of opposing Russia, weaken public confidence, and deter long-term Western support for Ukraine. However, while the probability of a deliberate Russian attack on the UK remains low, the risk of incidents increases as military activity, intelligence operations and hostile probing become more frequent.

In 2026, escalation is more likely to stem from dangerous air or maritime encounters, covert sabotage operations exposed publicly, major cyber incidents with visible real-world impact, and/or attacks on infrastructure that demand attribution and response. These scenarios are particularly dangerous because they compress decision-making timelines and raise the risk of miscalculation. UK defence leaders have been careful to stress that the chance of conflict is “remote but not zero” — a deliberate attempt to prepare the public for heightened risk without inducing panic.

NATO’s trajectory into 2026 is therefore one of sustained rearmament and readiness. European allies are increasing defence spending, rebuilding stockpiles, strengthening air and missile defence, and normalising a forward military presence in Eastern Europe.

Rather than matching this symmetrically, Russia is likely to respond asymmetrically, doubling down on the areas where it retains advantage, such as cyber and information warfare, covert action and sabotage, political and economic coercion, and intelligence and proxy operations.

This dynamic creates a paradox: NATO becomes stronger militarily, but the grey-zone threat environment becomes more hostile. For the UK, this reinforces the reality that national security is no longer confined to the battlefield or the armed forces — it extends into critical infrastructure, private industry, public trust and societal cohesion.

One of the clearest signals from the UK intelligence community is that public perception itself is a contested domain. By 2026, Russian information operations are likely to be, more targeted and locally tailored, amplified through AI-enabled content generation, and designed to exploit existing social and political grievances. Rather than persuading audiences of a single narrative, these operations aim to undermine trust, exacerbate division, and increase fatigue — particularly around issues such as defence spending, support for Ukraine, cost-of-living pressures and political legitimacy. For the UK, this places growing importance on strategic communications, media literacy, and rapid counter-disinformation capabilities, alongside traditional intelligence and law-enforcement responses.

In summary, 2026 is best understood not as a countdown to war, but as a year of entrenched strategic contest. The UK faces a persistent Russian threat that is unlikely to disappear, even if the situation in Ukraine evolves. The danger lies less in tanks crossing borders and more in sustained pressure, ambiguity, and the cumulative impact of hybrid operations.

For policymakers, businesses and security professionals, the challenge in 2026 will be managing escalation risk, strengthening resilience, and maintaining public confidence — all while avoiding the missteps that could turn a shadow conflict into something far more dangerous.

If deterrence holds, 2026 will not be remembered as the year war broke out — but it may well be remembered as the year the UK finally accepted that national security is no longer episodic, but permanent.

When all’s said and done…

In conclusion, the UK-Russia relationship is now defined by confrontation and caution. Britain’s Armed Forces Chief put it starkly: “The situation is more dangerous than I have known during my career”. This encapsulates the gravity felt in London’s corridors of power. The threat from Russia spans domains – military, cyber, espionage, and ideological – and so the response must be holistic. The UK and its allies are doubling down on deterrence and defence, shoring up weaknesses revealed by recent events. While direct war remains unlikely (and unwinnable), the risk landscape demands serious attention. The new normal is one of persistent hybrid conflict, high alert for escalation, and significant national investment in security and resilience.

Ultimately, a clear-eyed realism guides the UK’s approach: hope for peace, prepare for war, and leave nothing to chance. The united stance of NATO, the improvements in UK readiness, and the vigilance of intelligence agencies all send a message to Moscow that any aggression will be met with strength. That message, paired with prudent diplomacy, is the best recipe for preventing the worst outcomes. The coming years will test this strategy as the clash of wills between Putin’s Russia and the West plays out – but if Britain and its allies stay resolved, adapt to new threats, and avoid rash provocation, they can navigate this perilous period without tipping into the abyss of war. The cost of complacency is simply too high, and as Sir Richard Knighton reminded the UK, “more families will know what sacrifice for our nation means” if it fails to deter the threat. By heeding the warnings and preparing accordingly, the UK aims to ensure that sacrifice is never called for, and that this 21st-century Cold War remains cold.