Sub-Saharan Africa

River systems are not only trade routes but also pathways through which criminal networks and major global powers exert territorial control. Strategic waterways like the Paraguay–Paraná, Mekong, and Congo have become sites for drug trafficking, resource smuggling, and intense competition between Washington and Beijing for strategic resources and geopolitical power.

Railways, particularly the Lobito Corridor and the Tanzania–Zambia Railway, have regained strategic importance as they connect the Copperbelt to the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Transport infrastructure has become a key instrument of international influence and geopolitical power. Global competition driven by control over routes bringing critical minerals to world markets allows African countries to leverage this rivalry to attract investment and development.

Although external support in Mali has strengthened the military and prevented regime collapse, it has failed to restore control over large parts of the country. Insurgent groups such as JNIM have employed tactics, including blockades and ambushes, to weaken state forces before attacks and sustain pressure over time. More coercive operations have alienated local communities, contributing to insurgent recruitment and reinforcing the dynamics they aim to resolve.

The sea has always been a space of trade, crime and power. What is changing is the density of threats and the number of actors willing to use vessels as instruments of leverage. Piracy has not disappeared, but it is no longer the whole story. Future maritime risk map will be shaped as much by states, sanctions, militias and militarised law enforcement as by pirates with weapons and ladders.

Since 2020, five West African countries have experienced military coups - Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger - with several now under junta rule. This political shift has further weakened already fragile state institutions and reduced cooperation with external partners, limiting coordinated responses to cross-border threats.

Township violence reflects long-standing structural inequality, unemployment, and limited economic mobility. Illegal mining networks have become powerful criminal systems. They don’t just steal resources; they control territory with weapons, ensuring that communities live in fear. Reducing crime requires more than police alone. Without public trust in the police and government institutions, long-term stability becomes difficult.

Copper-driven growth is reshaping Zambia’s economy, with booming demand from AI, green energy and defence sectors boosting GDP growth and attracting billions in foreign investment. Global competition for copper is intensifying, as major powers and new investors race to secure supply, positioning Zambia as a strategic player in the energy transition.

Pre- and post-election violence in the country highlights growing dissatisfaction with President Paul Biya’s long rule and raises concerns about the legitimacy of the electoral process. The ongoing violence could lead to additional security measures, including restrictions on movement. Furthermore, western governments out of fear of escalating violence may issue travel warnings for their citizens. Armed groups and insurgents operating in the country could exploit the unre

Youth-led protests in Madagascar, initially sparked by chronic water and electricity shortages, culminated in a military seizure of power and President Rajoelina’s fleeing the country. The ensuing political crisis highlights deep structural and systematic challenges, including high poverty rates and inequality. A resolution to the crisis is dependent on whether the military leadership can successfully manage the transition timeline.

Kabila's sentencing might worsen ongoing crisis in Congo, possibly causing more violence as various groups/movements react to the ruling. The trial raises concerns about how the country’s justice system is being used for political gains, suggesting that the Tshisekedi administration may be targeting major opposition. The court’s ruling poses a threat to the already fragile peace agreements between DRC and Rwanda/M23, complicating efforts to bring stability to the Great

The blockade in Kayes region imposed by JNIM reflects a major strategic shift toward economic disruption in the region. JNIM’s recent activities in the country demonstrate the level of control they exert, particularly in Mali’s western border areas. The military’s focus on protecting its image could be a major obstacle to achieving success in the fight against jihadists. The recent blockade may prompt some companies in the affected area to evaluate their operations a

JNIM has pushed to expand from Burkina Faso toward Niger, and southward toward Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo over the years. Benin and Togo continue to face an increasing number of attacks, while Ghana remains on high alert due to its proximity to Burkina Faso and Togo and an ongoing chieftaincy crisis in the country’s north. Northern Togo has also seen a rise in attacks as militants target Togolese soldiers in the border areas.

Barros’s dismissal underscores ongoing power struggles as President Sissoco clings to power ahead of the upcoming November 2025 elections. The upcoming elections may face credibility issues due to the fact that CNE has lost its authority to function legitimately. Continued tensions between the government and opposition may lead to unrest in the near future, particularly if further actions taken by Sissoco’s government undermine the opposition's role in Guinea-Bissau’s p

The recurring anti-movement demonstrations have continually highlighted Angola’s questionable political leadership and deep rooted economic challenges. The situation places President João Lourenço, and his administration under scrutiny for clamping down on protesters and for police brutality against civilians. Although calm has been restored to most areas where violence occurred, the risk of renewed protests remains, as the government has yet to complete the subsidy removal p

Ghana’s northern porous borders and Bawku's proximity to Togo and Burkina Faso make it a critical national security concern, mainly due to the spread of jihadist activities in the Sahel and extremists’ expansionist ambitions in the coastal region. The prolonged conflict has led to the indefinite closure of key businesses, crippling economic activity and local governance, risking long-term economic marginalisation.

On 24 July 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted two ex-militia commanders, Alfred Yekatom and Patrice Edouard Ngaïssona, of multiple war crimes and crimes against humanity. Their crimes included the killings of predominantly Muslim civilians and a deliberate attack on a religious building during the conflict that erupted between 2013 and 2014.

France’s latest withdrawal adds to the growing wave of anti-colonial sentiments and perceived threats to sovereignty, particularly towards France across Africa. Anti-French protests were organised in Mali, Senegal, Niger and Burkina Faso as protesters demanded the departure of French troops and a reassertion of national sovereignty. In 2021, several French-owned businesses were torched and looted during mass demonstrations in Senegal.

U.S. President Donald Trump hosted leaders from Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania and Senegal at the White House for a three-day summit that began with a working lunch in the State Dining Room on 09 July 2025. A high-stakes summit designed to reassess American influence across a continent. Each of these countries is currently facing a 10% tariff on exports to the U.S.

Despite public outcry, the Togolese government is unlikely to reverse the constitutional reforms which extend Gnassingbé’s power indefinitely. Hence, further anti-government unrest is likely in the near term. This will likely manifest in the form of roadblocks and curfews, which will directly disrupt supply chains, causing operational delays for businesses.

Ongoing clashes between government forces and armed militias, as well as tensions between the ruling government and opposition, pose significant threats to the political climate in the country. MINUSCA plans to support the CAR government by conducting border patrols across various prefectures ahead of the elections, just as they assisted with logistics and technical issues during the voter registration process in November 2024 and March 2025.