Mali - JNIM intensifies “economic war” in an effort to expand its control beyond the Sahel

Key Takeaways:

• The blockade in Kayes region imposed by JNIM reflects a major strategic shift toward economic disruption in the region.

• JNIM’s recent activities in the country demonstrate the level of control they exert, particularly in Mali’s western border areas.

• The military’s focus on protecting its image could be a major obstacle to achieving success in the fight against jihadists.

• The recent blockade may prompt some companies in the affected area to evaluate their operations amid safety concerns and financial risks.

JNIM road blockade in Kayes region, a safety risk

Recent militant activities in the Sahel region have continued to highlight the nexus between jihadist activities and public infrastructure. While roads in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali play a major role in the movement of commercial goods and the transportation of people, these jihadist groups have recognised their importance and are exploiting this by imposing blockades on key routes.

To further illustrate, earlier in the month, on 03 September 2025, militants from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) reportedly established a blockade in Mali’s Kayes and Nioro du Sahel cities, both in the Kayes Region of western Mali, near the Senegal and Mauritania borders. Reportedly, this route is responsible for a significant percentage of Malian imports relying on the port of Dakar.

The blockade was reportedly announced by the group after the claimed responsibility for a kidnapping incident that occurred earlier that day around 1100hrs (local), where two drivers and several passengers were taken. Some of the victims who were not from Kayes were freed, while those from the region were held hostage. Again, on 04 September 2025, armed men suspected to linked be linked to this jihadist group kidnapped six truck drivers who were members of the Senegal Truck Driver’s Union (URS). Twenty-four hours later, Daouda Lo, the union’s spokesperson, confirmed their release. There is limited information regarding the kidnap from media sources.

The captured drivers, who spoke a different language from their captors, did not provide details of their experiences at the hands of the militants. According to media sources, the blockade did not come as a complete surprise, it was said that the group had reportedly issued a threat in July 2025.

Motive for blockade, a reaction to local support for military?

A report speculated that the reason for the blockade may be connected to the alleged support that people in Nioro du Sahel and Kayes have for the transitional government. While it is uncertain if this is the sole reason, the group’s decision to release kidnapped travellers who are not from Kayes may strengthen this argument. Jihadist groups, not only in the Sahel region but across sub-Saharan Africa, often seek violent means to retaliate against communities they perceive as having betrayed them. The recent killing of 63 civilians and soldiers by Boko Haram militants further demonstrates how such groups launch violent campaigns against those they believe have aligned with authorities.

FAMA’s response to the restriction of flow of goods and people

Military authorities in Mali have refuted reports of blockades by the jihadist group, instead they are downplaying the impact and explained that the roadblocks were due to “isolated incidents,” without providing additional information. However, on 11 September 2025, local media reports indicated that FAMA carried out airstrikes in the Kayes region, killing a number of militants and destroying equipment. Malian authorities have a history of denying reports of jihadist activities, particularly when such reports seem detrimental to the nation’s reputation or undermine the government’s counterinsurgency efforts.

This may also be part of their strategy to avoid promoting jihadist propaganda in the country. Despite the airstrikes, jihadists on 13 and 14 September launched further attacks in the area by setting fire to trucks and military positions. Although it is said that the operation prompted the jihadists to clear some of the roadblocks, this does not eliminate them from the area.

JNIM’s “economic” war and its wider consequences for the Sahel

With this development, companies operating in this part of West Africa are now at a higher risk. Employees, contractors (including foreign nationals), locals, and anyone moving along affected roads or working in the area are exposed to violent attacks and kidnappings from not only JNIM but also IS-affiliated militants, which may come with ransom demands or, worse, death. They also hijack goods from vehicles, causing financial losses for their owners.

The blockade on the RN1, a major logistical route for goods like fish, cereals, and fuel to and from Mauritania’s Hodh el Gharbi and Senegal’s Tambacounda Region, will significantly affect the supply chain in the country, particularly in Bamako. The roadblocks have also created a backlog of vehicles that stretches several kilometres towards Bamako. The Malian people and businesses in Kayes will likely face increased economic pressure, with over 180,000 vulnerable individuals suffering as a result. Lo confirmed that Mali remains a critical and strategic location for Senegalese transporters. Unfortunately, these drivers have revealed that their options are limited, and they can only seek safer ways to enter Mali via land borders. Transporters and other motorists entering Mali from Senegal may continue to rely on military escorts, but this may not completely deter attacks. Meanwhile, due to fears of attacks, some transporters have been forced to suspend operations.

Since June, following the group's threats, there has been a notable increase in violent attacks targeting travellers, including acts of vandalism and arson against construction materials, sugar, and cement factories. Another major issue is the militants' ban on fuel importation. Some sources stated that the group had issued warnings to transport companies from Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Guinea, and Senegal. A ban on fuel imports would mean that Malians will experience scarcity for as long as the measure is in place, with a potential increase in transportation costs. The arson attack on 13 and 14 September involved trucks carrying fuel from Senegal, while tanker drivers in Zégoua, near the Ivory Coast border, are experiencing similar blockades. These recent activities continue to establish the group's strong presence and the level of control they exert, especially in Mali’s western border areas with neighbouring countries.