“We are Ready”: How Western European Countries See a Surge in Defensive Policies against Russia

Key Takeaways 

• The month of November marked a significant shift in Western European states’ defensive strategies.

• The UK encountered several Russian threats (a spy ship in British waters, cyberattacks, and satellite spying), while Germany and France increased their defence budgets and introduced voluntary conscription plans.

• The private sector is heavily implicated in European defence projects, especially as Russian threats manifest in hybrid forms; skills include AI, cyberspace, ammunition, vehicle, satellite services, and more.

Russia’s war in Ukraine is often portrayed and interpreted as an Eastern and Central European threat, with primarily economic repercussions on Western Europe. News fatigue and the interminable nature of the war have reduced the impact of the war on our newsfeeds and social behaviours.

This month of November has, however, seen a reinforced Russian threat to Western Europe. Spillover effects and economic repercussions are not the only concerns of Western policymakers, as the past few weeks have seen numerous security authorities revise their defensive policy and introduce legislative proposals that essentially reinterpret the Russian threat through a more traditional security conception and renewed counterintelligence efforts.

Renewed Russian Threat Perception among Western European States

After the US Army officials gathered with Western diplomats in Kyiv earlier this month, they gave a stark reminder of the Russo-Ukrainian political and military standstill. They announced that Russia has essentially amassed enough resources to develop its long-range weaponry stockpile, a missile threat that could not only knock out Ukraine but also threaten the West through missile and drone attacks. Last week’s US-brokered peace plan discussions were optimistic in reflecting a favoured Ukraine. Nevertheless, warnings permeate security discussions, where Western diplomats claim that even if the war with Ukraine were to end, Russia would continue to develop its arms production. Ukrainian military data corroborated the American analysts’ data on Russia’s arms industry buildup. A year ago, Moscow would fire missiles as soon as they were developed. This contrasts with the current assessments on missile stockpiling. Further elaborating on this threat to Western Europe, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently urged allies to increase their investments in the defence alliance. In a recent statement, he claimed that even with an agreement between Russia and Ukraine, “Russia will remain a long-term threat for a long time.”

In the past weeks, Germany and the UK revealed the threat posed by Russian (and Chinese) spy satellites to Western space assets. These regular instances of Russian stalking, jamming, and interference with Western satellites pose an existential threat to critical infrastructures and services. The dual purpose of space technologies implies that while some space technologies are used for military purposes, they are also useful to civilian activity. Examples include satellite imagery, telecoms, navigation and position data, and broadband internet access. When Russia first announced its plans to develop nuclear weapons in space last year, it illustrated predatory Russian ambitions and opened up conversations about Russia’s potential in disabling and destroying Western space assets. More than a decade ago, the US and France first sounded the alarm on Russian satellites, claiming they spy and collect information on their own satellites, including private sector satellites (like IntelSat). In response to this emerging threat, Germany has planned to budget an additional 35bn euros for future space projects.

Additional policy developments enhancing defence have been enacted in Germany in November 2025. Germany’s coalition government has namely agreed on a new 2027 military service plan intended to increase troop numbers. The plan will require all 18-year-old men to fill out and submit a questionnaire on their own volition and ability to serve, as well as undergo a medical screening process. The military service plan comes along with a state decision to commit to building Europe’s strongest army. The announcements follow a warning issued by German defence chief General Carsten Breuer earlier this year, declaring that NATO should prepare for a Russian attack that is likely to happen in the next four years. Nevertheless, a majority of young Germans and left-leaning individuals oppose the new military service plan. It is also important to note that a direct attack against Germany is extremely unlikely, and many opponents to the policy claim that it suppresses personal rights. Like many other Western countries, Germany has had a reduced armed forces size since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s looming threat has effectively pushed the challenge of rebuilding its military up the priority list. Denmark has also been cited as a country adopting similar conscription legislation.

Very similarly to Germany, France has seen renewed parliamentary discussions on military conscription. On 27 November was revealed that France will introduce a voluntary military service plan of 10 months for individuals aged between 18 and 19. The service is set to begin by mid-2026 and is intended to respond to, as French President Macron puts it, “accelerating [international] threats”. Around €2 billion has been set aside for the plan and is seen by the government as “significant and necessary”, especially at a time when Russia’s growing threat overshadows regional politics and dynamics. Some experts have argued that American security retrenchment in Europe and its weakening hegemony no longer provide sufficient security guarantees for European states, forcing them to shift their defensive priorities towards autonomy. In addition to this, in a statement that elicited significant social media uproar, General Fabian Mandon, France’s armed forces chief, declared France needs to ready itself for Russian aggression and future human losses. French MPs sought to downplay the gravity of his words but underlined that the backdrop of his message – Russia’s increasingly aggressive posturing – holds.

On Wednesday 26 November 2025, French police arrested four people accused of spying for Russia and of “colluding with a foreign power”. This news, although not rare, renewed counter-intelligence concerns in France. The Russian spies were mainly interested in French economic interests as they networked with French companies. Russian spies with similar plans had also been arrested in Germany’s Bavaria on suspicion of planting a bomb in military and industrial facilities. Confrontation among Western European powers against Russia increasingly incorporates hybrid tactics. National intelligence services have also linked seemingly unrelated destabilisation tactics to Russia, including a terrorist act involving pig heads being placed outside of French mosques in 2025 and stars of David being stencilled across Paris in 2023. Beyond the EU, it is also helpful to expand the conversation to the UK, as it has been more prominently targeted by Russia in the last month.

How is the United Kingdom dealing with this threat?

The UK’s November policy developments reflect the current climate of Russia’s threat. In his 19 November speech, UK Defence Secretary John Healey opened up on the threats to the UK. Specifically, he spoke of the Russian spy ship Yantar that had threatened British waters between 5 and 11 November. The Yantar vessel was capable of intelligence gathering and undersea cable mapping, and British planes sent out to monitor the ship were targeted by light lasers. This act can easily be interpreted as an escalatory and provocative attempt. Local ships in the area also reported GPS jamming, a tactic mainly used as a nuisance. Healy reiterated Russia’s growing threat to the UK, citing Russian incursions on NATO airspace and tens of thousands of cyber-attacks directed at the UK Defence system in the past year. The UK’s response has been billions more in defence investments, preparing military forces for conflict, and reinforcing security and defence commitments with Western European states.

In a more recent press release on 24 November, the government announced the UK Armed Forces have reinforced their patrols from the English Channel to the High North as Russian presence in UK waters grows. The Royal Navy has namely intercepted a Russian warship and tanker and deployed the RAF P-8 aircraft to monitor the North Atlantic. Military officers emphasised the importance of international cooperation in protecting international waters, and these recent activities have allowed for increased liaison between NATO and the Royal Navy. In more quantitative means, the UK has noted a 30% increase in Russian vessel presence in UK waters over the last two years.

The UK Ministry of Defence has also been criticised for being too reliant on US help. An overreliance on the US could essentially weaken UK defence preparations and resource mobilisation. A committee of British MPs has even stated that a US withdrawal is likely and therefore the UK and its European allies should be even more encouraged to develop their defence capabilities.

Just as the government released its budget statement on 26 November, it declared an increase in defence investment and planning. Yet, critics have warned that a simple budget increase is not sufficient in addressing national security, and a homeland defence plan needs to be developed and implemented. Presumably, there is a long-standing UK complacency about war. The long-held belief that Russia’s war on Ukraine is too far away to impact UK citizens directly ostracises the UK on the European defence scene. It weakens its position in NATO defence strategies.

Unbeknownst to the average British citizen, and perhaps even more relevant to this discussion on the Russian threat to the UK, is the prominent belief of England as a public enemy within Russian nationalist narratives and rhetoric. Ever since Brexit, the UK’s growing distance from the EU, and following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Britain’s strong position in providing military and intelligence services to Ukraine has essentially made it the bête noire of Moscow’s foreign policy. The recent events in the UK’s North Atlantic seas have only reinforced Russian antagonistic narratives, with Russian authorities framing the situation as British intelligence trying and failing to incite Russian pilots to defect to the West. Britain’s status as the Kremlin’s bogeyman has especially been reinforced by the Trump administration’s rapprochement with Putin in terms of developing a peace plan. The term “Anglo-Saxon” has even been reframed by Moscow as a term used to denigrate British authorities. The Kremlin has consequently been largely unwilling to foster diplomatic discussions with London, with British calls often going ignored, while German and French ones are answered.

Russia has also manifested as a growing cyber and intelligence threat to the UK in the past year. Russian military intelligence has been accused of using an espionage tool, the cyber group APT 28, wherein malware has been employed against user email accounts. Russian malicious hybrid operations increased in the last year, and UK citizens, among other Western individuals, saw their email accounts hacked and accessed. This interferes with operations around the world, fuelled by Russian geopolitical and military objectives. Russia’s hybrid is transnational, and as such, the UK has underlined its support for and pledge to collaborate with other governments, including the EU, Germany, and Czechia, in addressing the Russian Intelligence Services’ malicious cyber activity.

Openings and Concerns in a Potential Economy of War

Many economic and financial considerations can be drawn from the increase in defence budgets across Western Europe. Germany and France have already planned a drastic shift in their military budgets for the next year, though the UK is slower to follow. The most obvious economic impact can be delineated from future collaboration among militaries and private actors, especially in terms of technological development and innovation. The British Armed Forces have already disclosed that they seek broader heavy metals deals for planes, ships, and munitions building. Companies involved in drones and AI development are also highly sought after in terms of hybrid capabilities, and this can also expand to cyberspace capabilities and even space technologies. For example, a new Helsing factory has recently been inaugurated in Plymouth, involved in making sea and undersea drones. More broadly, the British Parliament seeks private actors to “invest and grow a [world-class] defence business” in the UK. Additionally, its plans for the British Armed Forces to become NATO’s next innovative military, rivalling Germany’s own goals and increasing competition. The Parliament also has pledged to match private investment with the government’s own defence investments and has begun reaching out to defence communities outside of Britain, seeking new skilled labour.

Defence cooperation between the UK and the EU has also promoted the involvement of the private sector. Indeed, British negotiators had pushed for the EU to accept contributions from British defence companies to participate in the EU’s £130bn defence loan scheme of 2026. Applications for British companies wanting to participate are due at the end of November 2025, with an entry fee. British MPs stated that this potential British contribution would bring back financial value for British taxpayers and the defence industry. UK organisations have also been sought after to build up UK resilience against cyber threats within the government’s Plan for Change. Increasing Russian cyberthreats have portrayed cyberspace as the next strategic and security frontier; as such, companies partaking in network defence see a significant rise in demand.

The industry that is possibly the most affected by increasing strategic defensive capabilities is private security and military firms. Germany has been the most active Western European nation in contracting private military and defence capacities, including collaborating with its biggest defence firm: Rheinmetall. As Trump pressures European and NATO countries to increase their spending, moves to re-arm and innovate security measures have led to a massive increase in demand for defence firms. The demands manifest in terms of vehicle and ammunition provisions, satellite competencies, AI, electronics, and more.