Why the Recent Coups in the Sahel Matter for Organised Crime Monitoring

The Sahel: Vulnerability and Illicit Economies

The Sahel region spans approximately 5,900km and includes parts of Senegal, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Sudan, Niger, northern Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania. It is characterised by low economic development, widespread poverty, and limited access to basic services such as food, clean water, healthcare, education, and sanitation. Geographic isolation and socio-economic barriers make many areas difficult to access, which contributes to high unemployment and vulnerability, allowing both criminal networks and violent conflict to coexist. These structural challenges have been further compounded by economic instability and weak governance.

Since the 1990s, the Sahel has faced growing pressure from organised criminal networks. Illicit markets have expanded to include trafficking in drugs, firearms, fuel, gold, and migrant smuggling, alongside the illegal trade of otherwise legal goods. These activities have disrupted formal supply chains and replaced them with informal and criminalised networks. Over time, the movement of high-value commodities such as cocaine, cannabis resin, fuel, and gold has transformed traditional trading routes into competitive illicit economies driven by profit and territorial control.

Coups, State Fragility, and Insecurity

Since 2020, five West African countries have experienced military coups - Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger - with several now under junta rule. This political shift has further weakened already fragile state institutions and reduced cooperation with external partners, limiting coordinated responses to cross-border threats. At the same time, borders continue to allow militants, weapons, and smugglers to move freely across the region. Instability in Mali and Burkina Faso has also spilled into neighbouring countries, with armed groups using rural zones and border areas as safe havens.

Militant Islamist groups linked to ISIS and Al-Qaeda have entrenched themselves in parts of the Sahel, operating within civilian populations and exploiting governance gaps. The region has become the deadliest kind of militancy in Africa, with 7,620 fatalities in the first half of 2024 alone. These groups have also expanded southwards toward coastal West Africa, increasing insecurity in countries such as Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, which were previously less affected by jihadist violence.

Organised Crime

Organised crime in the Sahel is deeply embedded within conflict dynamics. Criminal actors engage in trafficking and smuggling, creating networks where armed conflict, violence, illicit profits, and territorial control are closely interconnected. This has contributed to a “protection economy”, where armed groups control trade routes and impose fees on movement in exchange for “security”, effectively turning protection into a commodity.

Criminal networks exploit vulnerable communities and expand across borders, further weakening state stability and development. Key illicit markets include trafficking in medical products, gold, firearms, drugs, fuel, and migrants. In many cases, traffickers are directly linked to armed groups or operate in loose cooperation with them, exchanging services for payment. In the region, arms trafficking is particularly significant, with weapons circulating opportunistically depending on shifts in supply and demand. These flows are facilitated by organised criminal groups operating across porous borders, reinforcing both insurgency and criminal violence.

Communal conflicts, such as farmer–herder clashes, also intersect with organised crime. Cattle rustling across ethnic and community lines fuels cycles of violence and grievance, often contributing to recruitment into armed groups. For example, cattle raids during the 2012 Mali conflict encouraged Fulani recruitment into MUJAO, while in central Mali groups such as Katiba Macina have drawn support through self-defence narratives linked to livestock protection. In some cases, armed groups even establish legitimacy by protecting herds and punishing theft, positioning themselves as alternative governance providers.

Insurgency, Banditry, and Weak Governance

The worsening security situation is driven by overlapping insurgencies, criminal banditry, and weakened state capacity. Nigeria’s northeast continues to face Boko Haram and ISWAP attacks, including kidnappings and assaults on military positions. In Mali, JNIM and Islamic State - linked groups are intensifying violence, while northwestern Nigeria experiences persistent bandit attacks in states such as Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, and Kebbi.

Regional security cooperation has also deteriorated, particularly following Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force after its coup, reducing cross-border coordination. This has weakened states’ ability to enforce the rule of law and respond to organised crime, particularly in remote areas. As a result, communities face increased exposure to violence, human rights abuses, and reduced access to justice and basic services.

Escalating Violence and Regional Spillover

Violent extremist groups continue to drive instability and humanitarian crisis across the Sahel, creating wider security risks for Europe and the United States. In 2024, the Sahel accounted for around 51% of global terrorism-related deaths, highlighting its role as the epicentre of global extremist violence. It also remains a major transit route for migration toward North Africa and Europe, meaning escalating insecurity is likely to increase displacement pressures on neighbouring states and European border systems. The worst-affected areas remain the Liptako-Gourma region and the Lake Chad Basin.

Groups such as JNIM, ISGS, and ISWAP continue to exploit weak governance to carry out attacks against both civilians and state forces, while external actors have also influenced local conflict dynamics. The scale of deaths in previous years has marked a sharp increase and demonstrating the accelerating scale of violence across the region.

The Reshaping of Organised Crime in the Sahel

The recent coups in the Sahel matter for organised crime monitoring because they have further weakened already fragile governance and disrupted regional cooperation, reducing the capacity to respond to cross-border criminal activity. This fragmentation allows criminal networks and armed groups to expand more easily across porous borders with limited oversight. As insurgency, communal conflict, and illicit economies become increasingly interconnected, trafficking continues to fund and sustain armed actors. The Sahel is therefore evolving into a deeply integrated criminal network, making organised crime significantly harder to monitor and disrupt.