The Fraying of Russia’s Caucasian Curtain: Moscow’s Regional Influence Under Threat Following Tensions with Baku

Key Takeaways:

• Diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have deteriorated significantly following the death of 2 Azeri nationals in Yekaterinburg.

• This rift is assessed as likely to worsen in the short to medium term: a trend which would have significant ramifications for regional security within the Caucasus region.

• Azerbaijan faces an increased risk of Russian-led sabotage and influence operations within its borders, which could be used to damage critical infrastructure and ferment civil unrest.

• Russia’s withdrawal from its traditional peacekeeping role is assessed as likely to provide space for Azeri President Ilham Aliyev to conduct bolder operations against a weakened Armenia with the assistance of Turkey.

• Border regions between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia are assessed as likely to face an increased threat of military clashes due to the emerging power vacuum created by Russia’s withdrawal of influence.

• Central Asia may stand to benefit economically from Azerbaijan’s strategic realignment, and become a preferred transit route for Azeri goods and energy exports.

• Domestic pressures created by the war in Ukraine are assessed as likely to place Russia’s global security partnerships under strain, leaving nations such as Iran, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, and Niger at greater risk of worsening instability.

Russia-Azerbaijan Split: Driving Factors and Recent Events

At first glance, one would be forgiven for assuming a natural alignment between Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both leaders maintain strict authoritarian practices, have shown little hesitation in using military force to annex territory from neighbouring states, and project undeniably “strongman” images to their domestic audiences. However, recent weeks have revealed deep fissures in this relationship, the widening of which poses serious questions for the future of regional security in the Caucasus.

On 27 June 2025, a Russian police operation in the city of Yekaterinburg resulted in the deaths of two Azeri nationals as part of cold case murder inquiries dating back to 2001. Two of the suspects, brothers Ziyaddin and Huseyn Safarov, died in custody, while several others were taken to hospital. One suffered a “heart attack” while the other suspect’s cause of death “is being established”, according to Russian prosecutors. Authorities also purported that the suspects were part of “a criminal group” allegedly involved in other murders and the sale of counterfeit alcohol which killed 44 people in 2021. One of the injured men reported that masked officers began breaking his front door at dawn, frightening his children. The officers allegedly “turned the house upside down and kept beating us for an hour without asking anything”, according to Mohammed Safarov. Mr Safarov also reported that his elderly father was beaten, electrocuted, and requested to fight on behalf of the Russian army in Ukraine.

In response, the Azeri government enacted a series of retaliatory actions against Russian targets. Namely, authorities arrested 2 Russian nationals accused of working on behalf of the FSB intelligence service, whilst simultaneously shutting down a local branch of Sputnik: a Russian state-owned media outlet.  Meanwhile, Azerbaijan's Culture Ministry confirmed on 29 June 2025 that concerts, exhibitions, festivals and performances were cancelled on account of "the demonstrative targeted and extrajudicial killings and acts of violence committed by Russian law enforcement agencies against Azerbaijanis on ethnic grounds in Yekaterinburg”.

This incident marks a nadir in relations between Baku and Moscow, and follows months of mounting tension between the two neighbours. In December 2024, 38 people were killed when an Azerbaijani Airlines plane bound for the Chechen capital of Grozny was shot down, allegedly by a Russian anti-aircraft missile fired by mistake. President Aliyev subsequently accused Putin of trying to cover up the incident for several days, and despite receiving an apology from the Russian leader, did not receive formal acknowledgment of the Russian military’s involvement with the incident.  

From Russia’s perspective, Azerbaijan’s military operations against Armenia have directly threatened the country’s strategic interests. Moscow, largely in an effort to minimise the risk of unrest developing in its restive southern regions, has attempted to pacify the region through a series of peacekeeping operations. In 2023, Azerbaijan’s lightning offensive in the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region conclusively broke the military stalemate previously maintained with Armenia, a balance maintained largely by Russian peacekeepers. This was largely made possible by closer defence cooperation with Turkey, whose Bayraktar assault drones proved instrumental in targeting Armenian units with greater precision and speed. This alliance threatens to upset Russia’s military dominance in the Caucasus: a development which could have significant impacts on regional security.

Strategic Implications for the Caucasus

Should relations between Russia and Azerbaijan deteriorate further, a fundamental reorganisation of defence and economic alliances is likely to take place within the Caucasus. Baku remains highly wary of the resurgence of Russian influence in Georgia, previously a key transit route for Azeri exports. This could push Azerbaijan to explore the strengthening of alternative export partnerships with countries including Iran, Kazakhstan, or Turkmenistan. Whilst each of these carries significant political and economic challenges, the perceived threat of Russian aggression may nevertheless inspire policymakers to explore these options in further detail. This could provide a significant long-term boost to economic and diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Central Asia: a development which would likely benefit the strategic ambitions of both partners.

Meanwhile, Azeri security officials will likely have begun preparations for the increased possibility of Russian influence operations being attempted over the next several months. If initiated, this would likely involve a repetition of tactics witnessed in Georgia including the dissemination of online misinformation, support for opposition political movements or extremist groups, and the orchestration of low-level physical sabotage operations against critical infrastructure targets such as manufacturing plants, transportation arteries, or energy production facilities.

President Aliev, emboldened by his increasingly close ties with Turkey, is likely to become more ambitious and far-reaching in his operations against Armenia. Without the deterrent posed by Russian peacekeepers, little now stands in the way of Aliyev’s ambitions to annex Armenian territory and realise the “greater Azerbaijan” theory regularly espoused by his loyalists. Armenia, meanwhile, remains shackled by political infighting, security threats posed by pro-Russian separatist militias, and unclear commitments from the United States regarding security guarantees. This could inspire further clashes occurring along the Azeri-Armenian border in the medium to long term as Aliyev attempts to consolidate gains against a weakened Armenia.

Future of Russia’s Global Security Partnerships

More broadly, tensions with Baku reveal the significant extent to which the Kremlin’s network of diplomatic alliances has damaged by domestic factors in recent years. When faced with the threat of domestic instability, Moscow’s knee-jerk response is to conduct harsh crackdowns against diaspora and minority communities including Muslims, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Azeris.  Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Azeris have been disproportionately targeted by military recruitment offices aiming to reinforce front lines units. This policy, likely created to minimise the losses incurred by ethnic Russians and thus maintain popular support for the “special military operation”, has provoked fury in Baku, who have vehemently resisted attempts to conscript Azeri nationals.

If such strategies are continued, Moscow risks alienating key partners in central Asia, many of whom have begun exploring closer relationships with Europe and China over the past several months. Recent negotiations between the United States and Turkmenistan are just one of many examples illustrating the strategic realignment already underway in central Asia, which could accelerate further if Moscow continues to antagonise diaspora populations within its borders.

The primary factor straining Russia’s international security partnerships is ongoing conflict in Ukraine. This war has both inspired crackdowns against central Asian and Caucasian communities within Russia, and caused Moscow to neglect its duties as a security provider for other nations within its alleged sphere of influence. A significant proportion of military assets previously earmarked for operations in the Middle East and the Sahel have since been redeployed to Ukraine: a phenomenon which has sparked panic among regimes reliant on Moscow for their internal security. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iran’s vulnerability to Israeli strikes, and the spread of jihadist violence in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and the Central African Republic highlight the severe limitations of Russian security assistance in times of existential crisis. Whilst the relative inability of these regimes to operate without Moscow’s backing limits their ability to pursue independent security policies, these incidents will nevertheless be viewed with grave alarm by their leaders, causing them to question Russia’s ability and will to provide effective security as witnessed in previous decades.

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