Türkiye - Ankara Redraws The Security Landscape
The rise of a transregional defence network
Key Takeaways :
Ankara is developing, alongside its membership of NATO, a transregional defence network based on military and industrial cooperation, with the aim of strengthening its strategic autonomy and capacity for international power projection.
The expansion of co-production and technology transfer agreements, including those associated with the Badr MoU, may increase compliance risks for Western suppliers.
By exporting military hardware and operational doctrine to states positioned along key chokepoints, Türkiye can expand its indirect influence over major maritime trade corridors.
The strategy of defence autonomy
Türkiye, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952, is gradually moving beyond strategic dependence on the Atlantic bloc to position itself as an autonomous, transregional security centre. This pursuit of defence autonomy stems from a series of geopolitical frictions that have shaped the country’s recent history. Chief among them was Ankara’s exclusion from the F-35 fighter jet programme by the United States under CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), following Türkiye’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system. In 2024 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that “in a period when our region is constantly on edge, establishing new equations in foreign policy is not just a choice but a necessity for Türkiye”; today, this necessity has taken on a more structured form.
While, at the operational level, Ankara seeks to deter direct threats to its borders, at the strategic level it aims to break free from what it perceives as technological dependence on Washington and Brussels, rejecting its historic role as the Alliance’s southern outpost. In doing so, Türkiye has developed a hybrid system combining defence diplomacy, deterrence-building, autonomous geopolitical projection, and extensive partner diversification, transforming itself from a security consumer into a global producer and exporter of military hardware and doctrine.
The Mecca Defence Alliance axis
Türkiye has expanded its strategic reach by integrating into the Mecca Defence Alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This emerging axis aims to establish collective deterrence against any act of aggression, with Article 2 stipulating that an armed attack against any one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all. Although echoing the principle of mutual assistance, the alliance is not a rigid formal treaty modelled on NATO’s Article 5, but rather a flexible network for strategic, military, and industrial coordination.
Ankara pursues defence diplomacy by leveraging its rapidly expanding domestic manufacturing industry. This supply chain relies on Baykar for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and drones (TB2/TB3/Akıncı); Roketsan for missiles and munitions, including the Stand-Off Missile (SOM), Laser-Guided Missile (CİRİT), and BORA tactical ballistic missile; and Aselsan for advanced electronics, surveillance, and communications systems. Arms sales are also accompanied by offers of co-production and technology transfer. This approach creates long-term strategic interdependence with Islamabad, which contributes a large, battle-tested military backed by nuclear deterrence, and Riyadh, which provides financial resources, geographical centrality, and influence in global energy markets.
From Türkiye to Indonesia: the Quadrilateral Agreement
In a system where the great powers are pursuing far-reaching changes, middle powers tend to focus on the regional landscape, seeking to maintain their own balance. Based on this principle, on 21 October 2026, Türkiye, Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia signed the “Badr Memorandum of Understanding” in Doha. The quadrilateral agreement aims to strengthen the signatories’ industrial and defence capabilities by promoting the joint development of technologies and military production through a strategic partnership focused on research and technical training.
This cooperation draws on each country’s specific expertise, combining their respective strengths synergistically. Türkiye’s technological capabilities and its army’s experience gained in mountainous border regions — primarily through operations against militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — are integrated into a defence ecosystem involving Doha, Islamabad, and Jakarta. With a strong AA/A-1+ financial rating and a stable outlook, Qatar provides the economic strength required to finance this architecture. Although Barzan Holdings, the strategic investment arm of Qatar’s Ministry of Defence, had already signed defence agreements with regional players such as the Emirati EDGE and Saudi SAMI, the current acceleration is linked to Qatar’s complex position following the outbreak of the war with Iran.
Given the various attacks it has suffered since the conflict began, including the drone incursion that struck Al-Udeid Air Base, Doha could benefit from this cooperation in countering ballistic missiles, drone threats, and cyberattacks. Türkiye is also a major ally of the Gulf monarchy, having deployed its forces to Doha during the 2017 diplomatic crisis.
Pakistan’s practical experience, shaped by decades of conflict with India over Kashmir and with Afghanistan, brings considerable production capacity and a skilled workforce to the bloc. Islamabad already maintains crucial bilateral defence cooperation with Türkiye, demonstrated by the co-production of drone technologies and MILGEM corvettes, as well as technology transfer and engineering collaboration linked to the TF-X programme (now KAAN, a fifth-generation multirole fighter).
Finally, Indonesia completes the geographical picture, extending this network into the Indo-Pacific. Industrially, Indonesia’s state-owned arms manufacturer PT Pindad and Türkiye’s FNSS have co-designed the Kaplan MT medium tank, now manufactured in Indonesia. Beyond providing the maritime dimension of the equation, Jakarta sees Ankara as a non-aligned technological “third way” and a means of rapidly strengthening its military capabilities without having to choose between the US and Chinese spheres of influence.
What are the implications for the West?
The emergence of a parallel security architecture does not formally replace NATO, but it undermines the Alliance’s exclusivity, allowing Türkiye to operate in a grey area. In this context, what should decision-makers consider?
Ankara is no longer a straightforward ally, but is becoming a hybrid geopolitical ecosystem in its own right. It thus offers an operational alternative free from Western political constraints, allowing partners to bypass US–China bipolarity.
By leveraging technology transfer and the co-production of weapons systems, Türkiye is laying the foundations for a closed-loop military ecosystem of “technological recycling”. Within this network, allied countries can cooperate to overcome Western restrictions, circumventing sanctions or stringent limitations on the acquisition of dual-use technologies.
Western businesses face significant compliance risks, as a component sold legally could end up being incorporated into co-production programmes, potentially triggering secondary sanctions.
Logistically, by projecting its military and electronic influence into key global trade chokepoints, Türkiye can indirectly influence the security of maritime corridors without needing to move its fleet from the Mediterranean: the Red Sea (Saudi Arabia), the Persian Gulf (Qatar), the Indian Ocean (Pakistan), and the Strait of Malacca (Indonesia).
