Could Satellite Collisions Promote International Cooperation in Outer Space?

Examining the Sino-American relationship on space traffic management

Key Takeaways 

●        In November 2025, the CNSA reached out to NASA concerning a manoeuvre to move a satellite and prevent a collision.

●        Satellite collision avoidance is paramount to space exploration as it creates space debris, harming private and government space projects.

●        Bilateral cooperation on space issues between the US and China remains extremely limited. With no change in sight, it paves the way for private interests within both domestic space industries.

The Beginning of Sino-American Cooperation in Space?

Earlier in November 2025, the Chinese National Space Agency (CNSA) reached out to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) regarding a manoeuvre to avoid a potential collision between a Chinese and US satellite. This marks the first time the CNSA has directly reached out to NASA regarding space traffic management. In the past, NASA space sustainability officials would be the ones to reach out to the CNSA regarding potential collision avoidance.

The move comes as both China and the US are rapidly expanding their satellite forces. China, through its Guowang and Thousand Sails megaconstellation satellite programs and the US through SpaceX’s commercial Starlink constellation. The rapidly increasing number of objects in orbit requires greater coordination among international satellite operators to reduce collisions and prevent additional clouds of space debris.

This bilateral communication also reflects China’s increased role in space situational awareness. Meaning, the CNSA has advanced capabilities in understanding events and object trajectories in orbit, and now has the capacity to begin coordinating with other operators. This development is in line with China’s 2022 space white paper, where it had projected a strengthened presence in space for the 2021 to 2026 period.

Formal collision-avoidance governance, however, is unlikely to be institutionalised due to the Wolf Amendment. The amendment delineates guidelines to prevent NASA from using federal funds to cooperate with China, significantly limiting bilateral interaction. American space policy officials have no plans to dissolve or alter the Wolf Amendment, especially as the US-China space race is gaining momentum and weaves itself within wider national security narratives. The Wolf Amendment had also prevented China’s participation in the International Space Station (ISS), leading the nation to develop its own international space station, Tiangong. Although the next section will examine the necessity of cooperation and coordination on space issues, especially as it sees growing militarisation and conflict, bilateral relations between NASA and CNSA remain significantly limited.

Why Care About Space Debris and Collision-Avoidance?

Space debris, also known as space junk, includes all the human-made objects orbiting Earth that are no longer useful. With the exponential growth of orbital launches and general space activities in recent years, collisions, accidental breakups, and spent rocket stages have produced a substantial amount of floating fragments. Debris can drift through space for decades, creating an orbital environment oversaturated with hazardous objects prone to hitting vital space infrastructures. Around 73% of space debris today can be attributed to launches from the US, Russia, and China, the earliest dating back to 1958. Around 45,000 human-made objects orbit Earth today, and any one of them poses a threat to space stations and satellites. Not only does this pose a threat to a nation’s space missions, but also the global space economy; an economy that is both public- and private-based and valued at more than $600 billion. Around 83% of tracked space junk is located in low-Earth orbit (LEO), a key altitude for human space missions, and communication and observation satellites.

Around 200,000 objects with sizes ranging from 1cm to 10cm are estimated to be in orbit, with the smaller objects being much harder to track through traffic management and collision-avoidance data. Additionally, 65% of active satellites in LEO are part of the Starlink constellation, with SpaceX chief Elon Musk hoping to launch 42,000 satellites in the near future. China has also announced plans to have 14,000 active satellites in orbit by 2030.

A recent example of the tangible harmful effects of space debris is the delay of the Shenzhou 20 spacecraft meant to ferry three CMSA astronauts back to Earth. The launch system was damaged by space junk – a chip of paint – on 5 November 2025. The continued proliferation of space debris is expected to contribute to rising harm to space infrastructures. The threat of space debris to the two current space stations, the ISS and Tiangong, also affects crucial public services, including communications, navigation data, weather metrics, and climate monitoring.

The growth of space traffic demands increased management and collaboration between the major contributors, China and the US. Beyond being a governmental issue, astronomers have also encountered complications in research data collection due to LEO’s oversaturation. Satellites blocking observatories can block observations of remote objects and phenomena. Collected imagery and vital data from cosmic light and radio waves can be worn down by satellite passages. If collisions were to proliferate and create more space debris, astronomical research would be severely impacted. The scientific community has subsequently been vocal in advocating for strengthened international space cooperation and traffic management.

Establishing a Future of Coordination

Currently there are around 13,000 active satellites are currently orbiting Earth, ten times more than a decade ago. Each satellite movement is carefully monitored, and avoidance manoeuvres (moving a satellite to prevent a collision with another satellite or debris) amount to around the tens of thousands in a year. There is currently no international coordination on space debris clean-up measures or on preventing debris-creating crashes, especially between China and the US. However, somewhat successful attempts have been made between EU actors within themselves and with the US.

The European Space Agency (ESA) and its EU member states have made efforts to preempt potential orbital debris risks, as materialised in the signing of the non-binding Zero Debris Charter in May 2024. It manifests as one of the first international attempts to address the debris of past space missions. Signatories vow to lower the risk of debris arising from a collision from 1,000 to 1. Further measures include implementing a clean-up spacecraft and increasing information-sharing concerning debris tracking data.

In terms of Sino-American cooperation, hostility between the states continues to overshadow mutual goods. Both governments, especially the Trump administration, view the global commons of outer space as an emerging arena for military proliferation and traditional security. Most notable have been recent developments in anti-satellite weaponry and nuclear space weapons. This goes against the foundational 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a treaty which pioneered space law and norms of behaviour and guided the next decades of international space cooperation through the lens of scientific exploration and economic competition. The 13 October 2020 signature of the Artemis Accords reinforced the Outer Space Treaty, as well as introduced norms of responsible behaviour for rescue and return missions and space systems registration. It has only been signed by the US and 42 of its allies, while the two other biggest space-faring nations, Russia and China, have not.

In the 1970s, despite growing security concerns in space, leaders were able to embrace common goals to benefit from space exploration. Cooperation between the US and USSR rested on the betterment of humanity thanks to the efforts of scientists, astronauts, and engineers. Future shared goals and bilateral agreements could be pursued through lunar communications, navigation services, and resource sharing in space. China and the US could similarly open up communications on establishing norms of behaviour in space exploration and sustainable practices, as well as begin discussions on orbital debris transparency and management.

Chinese officials have been open about cooperating with the US in the past. Beijing’s policy on space has been about encouraging cooperation as a basis for progress, instead of isolationism. While some progress has been made in exchanging Earth and space scientific data between NASA and the CNSA, almost all cooperation has been stopped since the aforementioned Wolf Amendment in 2011. Since then, the most identifiable attempt at bilateral cooperation has been a pragmatic attempt at de-escalation concerning Mars probes, particularly China’s Tainwen-1 Mars orbiter versus NASA’s pre-existing spacecraft.

Nevertheless, US space policy-makers maintain that competition will encourage more progress, development, and innovation within American space industries compared to collaboration. This is especially relevant when discussing space assets that are essential to US national security purposes. Due to the dual-use purpose of space technologies, collaborating with a competitor nation on space issues could threaten national security. Essentially, space technologies can be used for both military and civilian purposes and as such, a satellite providing navigational and positional data is relevant to both sectors. 

It is also important to recognise China’s newfound dominance in space. Its lunar mission, Chang’e, is directly competing with NASA’s own lunar space program in being the first to reach the lunar south pole. Its Qianfan project, or the Spacesail Constellation, is government-funded and also directly competes with Starlink in potentially providing global broadband coverage. Beijing’s space strategy prioritises autonomy and self-sufficiency in building a high-speed satellite network. Following the America First investment policy, the US sees its hegemony in LEO gradually weakening as the orbit grows contested. China’s progress in the field threatens the erosion of American dominance, and American retrenchment in its foreign space strategy could reduce the likelihood of governance structures and institutions regulating norms of behaviour in space being built.

A “New Space” Global Economy

Growing competition between China and the US and EU has driven innovation in scientific missions and satellite technologies. The rising competition in commercial space is inscribed within the burgeoning New Space economy. This emerging term encompasses all commercial space activities, and can include satellite internet (like Starlink), space tourism (as proposed by Blue Origin), asteroid mining (such as AstroForge), and lunar resource exploitation (including Interlune). With space technologies growing increasingly cost-effective and accessible, new private space actors regularly enter the market.

Despite a current majority of the companies being American, China has invested significant shares in the emerging market. Chinese satellite navigation system BeiDou is poised to rival the US’s GPS or the EU’s Galileo. Beijing has additionally pledged to develop its commercial space sector in the coming years, highlighting it as a strategic priority. For companies, this means increased investments in innovative technologies.

The Sino-American rivalry is bound to shape international norms and partnerships. While the US looks for partnerships with its allies in the EU, China favours collaboration with states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. China has prided itself on cheaper satellite launches and technology transfers, fostering a global space strategy that could threaten US hegemony in outer space. It targets space-based cooperation through its Space Information Corridor, bolstered by the Belt and Road Initiative, and cultivates economic development through collaboration on space issues. This also weakens the US and EU’s bargaining power when it comes to setting global standards for responsible behaviour in space exploration and exploitation.

Significant economic opportunities also present themselves in the US-China lunar space race. China has recently revealed plans to build an International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), collaborating on a lunar base with Russia. The aim is to have a permanent human presence on the Moon by 2036. The ILRS introduces an opening within Chinese-collaborated space exploration, resource extraction initiatives, scientific research, and sustainable habitat-building.

The US’s Artemis program in establishing human presence on the Moon is equally promising for commercial actors, as it has already collaborated with SpaceX on the development of space launch systems. The US and EU will also likely require research and development investments to maintain their leadership in space, seeing China’s advances. Closer collaboration with the private sector is also likely, as well as increased international partnerships among national space agencies.

Areas of Consideration for New Space Commercial Actors

Uncertainty as to the future of global cooperation on norms and standards of responsible behaviour in space exploration and the use of resources creates further unknowns concerning the future of space law and regulations. Certain treaties and domestic laws regulate the use of space and action-transparency for private actors, yet they are largely not accountable internationally. For commercial space interests in asteroid mining, space tourism, and technology development, it remains valuable to take into account a state’s space laws, regulations, and international partnerships. However, this also applies to private actors beyond New Space. Activities that rely on space systems, including navigation, communications, and related scientific data, are all concerned by these regulatory uncertainties. As Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated, reliance on private actor space systems, such as Starlink, affects various aspects of the economy and military and civilian life. Issues in transparency practices or contract withdrawals, for example, can have a lasting impact on contingent industries.

For now, significant investment interest can be found in the Chinese and US markets, as both countries aim to strengthen their private space sectors. Private partnerships to support their lunar space programs are in high demand. To an extent, the EU is also pursuing private actor input in certain space projects. EU countries are currently pursuing competitive space strategies, and significant opportunities remain, from lunar mining to developing reusable space launch vehicles to satellite contracts.

Standards regulating transparency and debris-minimisation practices can also be expected. As China, the US, and more space-faring actors are recognising the mutual harm of space debris, it would not be unlikely to find an agreement like the Zero Debris Charter to expand to more countries and incorporate binding mechanisms. Incorporating advanced collision-avoidance mechanisms and greater information-sharing practices may become necessary for commercial space-farers to consider.