Global Deep Dive – Israeli Strikes Against Iran Elevate Risk of Regional Conflict - 13 June 2025

Situational Update:

• On 13 June 2025 at 0400hrs (local), Israel launched “pre-emptive” strikes on Iran as part of operation Rising Lion, declaring a "special state of emergency". Dozens of strikes hit different areas of the country, targeting Tehran’s air defence systems and nuclear facilities, including Iran’s main enrichment facility in the city of Natanz, 225km south of Tehran. Shortly after, Iranian state media reported that Israel had struck residential areas in Tehran and other cities, with children being among those killed. Civilians using VPNs to circumvent Iran’s media censorship uploaded footage of buildings being struck. At 0730hrs (local), the Iranian Attorney General’s Office issued a statement directed at social media users, urging them to avoid actions that could "disturb the public’s psychological security". Iran’s state television also reported that the Revolutionary Guards headquarters in Tehran had been hit, resulting in the death of Chief Hossein Salami and the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, Mohammad Bagheri. Two senior nuclear scientists, Fereydoon Abbasi and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, were also killed.

  
  

• A spokesperson for the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) said that dozens of fighter jets were involved in the first stage of the attack. The statement also claimed that Iran was “closer than ever to obtaining a nuclear weapon”. Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu issued a statement, maintaining that the “operation will continue for as many days as it takes”. The reported scale of the latest attack is already greater than anything witnessed between the pair.

  
  

• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio released a statement, claiming that the US was “not involved in strikes”, asserting that “Iran should not target U.S. interests or personnel”. The attacks came just days after US President Donald Trump said he hoped to “avoid a conflict”. After Israel’s attack, he also outlined his wish for to “get back to the negotiating table” with Iran. Israel’s attack came just two days before the sixth round of Iran-US talks, scheduled for 15 June 2025 in Muscat.

  
  

• Undermining prospects for a diplomatic solution, reports emerged that Iran had launched over 100 drones toward Israel, many of which were successfully intercepted. A spokesperson for Iran’s armed forces said that the US and Israel would pay a “heavy price”, asserting that “the armed forces will certainly respond to this Zionist attack". Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that Israel "should anticipate a severe punishment". Israeli citizens have been urged to follow military guidance and told that they may have to remain in sheltered areas for an extended period.

  
  

• Calls have grown among the international community for de-escalation. A spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres outlined his concern and hope for “both sides to show maximum restraint”. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has also voiced his wish for both countries to "step back and reduce tensions urgently" in the interest of regional stability. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, Moscow condemns the “sharp escalation in tensions”

Defence Impact - SEVERE

Iran: Operation Rising Lion has significantly reduced Iran’s overall defence capabilities due to the destruction of nuclear, missile and drone assets. Damage to nuclear enrichment facilities such as the site in Natanz will be felt especially keenly by Tehran, who have repeatedly argued that the development of nuclear weapons is an essential deterrent to protect the country against existential threats posed by Israel and the United States. These capabilities have been further diminished by the elimination of Fereydoon Abbasi, the former head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, and Mohammad Mehdi Tehranchi, the president of the Islamic Azad University in Tehran. The loss of these senior nuclear scientists represents a significant loss of technical expertise and knowledge, which will hinder Iran’s long-term ability to develop nuclear capabilities. Additionally, Operation Rising Lion will likely reinforce the belief among Iranian policymakers that Israel presents an existential threat to national security. This will likely push Tehran to continue long-term efforts to develop nuclear weapons, which could witness closer collaboration with Russian and North Korean nuclear experts.

Operationally, the death of Revolutionary Guards Corp commander Hossein Salami and General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces, will diminish Iran’s short-term ability to plan and command military operations. Whilst Major General Mohammad Pakpou has already been confirmed as the new Chief of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the promotion of less experienced officers will result in a temporary reduction in expertise. This may limit Iran’s ability to coordinate both defensive and offensive operations, making the country increasingly vulnerable to attacks. Moreover, these deaths illustrate Israel’s proven ability to target and eliminate senior commanders within Iran: a tactic enabled by wide-reaching human intelligence networks and advanced technical capabilities. Any individual who fills a senior Iranian command post remain at high risk of targeting by Israeli forces due to the latent strength of their operational capabilities. 

Shortly after Operation Rising Lion’s initiation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu released a video stating that the operation will last for “as many days as it takes to remove the Iranian threat to Israel’s survival”. This suggests that future Israeli strikes against Iranian targets are highly likely to take place over the next several days, with some analysts suggesting that operations will last for at least 2 weeks. These will likely be concentrated against strategic targets such as weapons caches, munitions factories, and military bases throughout Iran. However, the destruction of Tabriz airport demonstrates that civilian infrastructure such as airports, ports, roads, railways, and energy facilities also remain at high risk of targeting.

Israel: From an Israeli perspective, the risk of Iranian retaliation poses a high risk to national security. The 100-strong drone swarm launched against Israel during the morning of 13 June 2025 is likely to be replicated over the coming days. Recently, Iranian officials have shown comparative restraint in their responses to Israeli strikes, as shown during the drone and missile salvos launched during April and October 2024 respectively. However, to assuage domestic concerns of showing weakness against Israel, this attack is likely to warrant a significantly more intense response from Iranian officials. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned that Israel “has prepared a bitter and painful fate for itself” and “must expect severe punishment”, indicating that any upcoming response will likely surpass the intensity of the attacks launched in 2024. This may involve combined air, missile, and drone assaults combined with ground sabotage operations against Israeli targets by Iranian intelligence officers. Attacks against critical infrastructure and targeted assassinations against senior defence or political officials may also form part of Iran’s planned response.

Furthermore, Iranian drone attacks have placed the Iron Dome air defence system under temporary strain, potentially providing an opening for other anti-Israel groups to stage attacks against the country. These could be initiated from southern Lebanon by Hezbollah operatives, Houthi rebels in Yemen, or pro-Iran militias in Iraq. Consequently, civilians in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem have been advised by authorities to position themselves near air raid and bomb shelters to prepare for incoming strikes. However, the present weakness of Iran’s proxy network means that these are likely to have only a limited impact.

Similarly, the pivot towards Iranian operations may result in the redeployment of Israeli assets and defence resources from Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank, reducing the ability of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) to operate in these areas to the same extent as witnessed in previous months. However, given the relative strength of Israeli forces compared to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, this reorganisation is unlikely to result in a significant shift of military momentum in these regions.

Region: On 12 June 2025, the United States evacuated family members of military personnel from several bases throughout the Gulf, citing intelligence reports that Iran and its proxy militias planned to stage attacks against American military bases in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Syria. This precaution likely suggests that American military bases are likely to be targeted both by missiles and small arms ground campaigns by pro-Iranian proxy militia groups. Should Iran stage direct attacks against American personnel or infrastructure, this would mark a serious escalation which threatens to involve the United States directly in a regional conflict.

Meanwhile, air defence systems throughout the Gulf region have been placed on high alert as neighbouring countries begin preparations to defend their maritime jurisdictions and airspace against potential incursions. The Jordanian Armed Forces announced that Royal Jordanian Air Force jets and air defence systems intercepted several missiles and drones which entered the country’s airspace during the morning hours (local) of 13 June 2025. The risk of missile or drone debris causing collateral damage in Jordan and Iraq remains moderate given their geographical location between Israel and Iran.

In the long term, the elimination of Iran’s nuclear capabilities may see Russia or North Korea lend more overt support to Iran, possibly encompassing the country within their nuclear umbrellas. On 13 June 2025, Iran announced that Russia plans to construct 8 nuclear reactors within Iran, many of which will be based in the southern province of Bushehr. Whilst unconfirmed, this initiative may witness the transfer of knowledge or technical expertise which could be used to facilitate the enrichment of uranium to weapons-grade standard. This would significantly elevate the risk of a regional conflict given the nearby presence of American assets.

Political Impact – SEVERE

Iran: Operation Rising Lion has significantly elevated the likelihood of regime change within Iran due to its destabilising effect on domestic politics. Whilst unconfirmed, the vast scale of Israel’s operation has prompted speculation as to whether authorities plan to initiate full regime change within Iran. This strategy carries significant levels of risks, and is highly likely to galvanise public opinion against Israel.

Regime change is instead more likely to be attempted by domestic rather than external organisers. Anti-Israel sentiments are highly likely to extend beyond the regime’s traditional support base, and has already sparked pro-regime rallies in cities such as Qom and Tehran. However, Operation Rising Lion may also be perceived as an opportunity by opposition groups as an opportunity to launch an internal revolution against the regime. Mass protest action witnessed between 2022 and 2023 highlights the significant extent to which anti-regime sentiments remain active within Iranian society. Therefore, the destabilisation of Iran’s security apparatus may be viewed by anti-regime factions as a potential window of opportunity for attempting internal regime change. If this such a campaign was attempted, a violent crackdown by state forces against both political organisers and civilians would be highly likely.

Israel: Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has consistently pushed for aggressive courses of action to be taken against Iran, will likely enjoy a short-term boost in domestic popularity. Historically, the leader’s previous ambitions to strike Iran have been largely curtailed by American efforts in previous years. However, the re-election of President Donald Trump in the United States has granted Netanyahu freer licence to operate an independent security policy due to ideological similarities between the two leaders and the Trump administration’s emphasis on isolationism. This operation will likely be seen as an endorsement of Netanyahu’s maximalist national security policy, and empower other Israeli nationalists to develop stronger political support bases.

However, the operation has also elevated the risk of senior political figures being subject to harassment, violent assaults, and assassination attempts from Iranian operatives or anti-Israel activists.  In an attempt to mitigate the threat of targeted attacks, the Israeli government have shut several embassies across the world and urged citizens to avoid displaying Jewish or Israeli symbols in public places. These measures highlight the operation’s detrimental impact on Israel’s global image, which will likely worsen as military operations continue. Should attacks be conducted against Israeli targets abroad, civil unrest is likely to worsen within Israel as demands for stronger action to be taken against adversaries grow louder.

Region: Operation Rising Lion has attracted condemnation from across the Arab world, including Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In official statements, the Saudi Foreign Ministry expressed its “strong condemnation and denunciation of the blatant Israeli aggressions against the brotherly Islamic Republic of Iran”, whilst the Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Israel’s strike “in the strongest terms” and expressed its “deep concern over the ongoing escalation and its repercussions on regional security and stability.” Despite the opposition of these states towards Tehran’s strategic ambitions, their desire to maintain regional peace and status-quo security arrangements sits firmly at odds with Israel’s increasingly confrontational security policy. As such, political and economic relations between Israel and the Gulf states are likely to deteriorate in the short term, resulting in possible restrictions to travel and trade.

Whilst publicly seeking to distance themselves from Operation Rising Lion, several factors suggest that Israeli operations have enjoyed tacit support from the United States. For example, the country’s decision to evacuate embassies and military bases in the Gulf region on 12 June 2025 may have been prompted by the receipt of Israeli plans to attack Iran. Meanwhile, social media comments made by President Donald Trump appear to support Israel’s attacks, warning of further violence to follow if Iran does not return to nuclear disarmament negotiations. In a post released on Truth Social, the President commented that "there is still time to make this slaughter, with the next already planned attacks being even more brutal, come to an end", warning that “Iran must make a deal before there is nothing left”. The fact that the United States is perceived to have either permitted or assisted Israeli operations will likely foster the development of anti-American political sentiments throughout the Middle East, which is likely to elevate the risk of American civilians, businesses, or embassies within the region being targeted with protest action or violence.

In response, Iran has formally withdrawn from negotiations with the United States, meaning that the agreement of a nuclear deal between the two states remains highly unlikely in the short term. Over the past several months, Oman has hosted 5 rounds of negotiations between Iranian and American diplomats aimed at limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment programs to be used for civilian purposes only. This withdrawal not only elevates regional security tensions due to its symbolic rejection of peace efforts, but suggests a renewed commitment from Tehran to continue its development of nuclear weapons capabilities, which diplomatic efforts appear unlikely to curb in the short to medium term. 

Economic Impact – HIGH

Iran: Domestically, Iran was already experiencing a range of economic challenges, including rampant inflation, a collapsing currency, budget deficits, and economic mismanagement. The country has struggled as a result of comprehensive international sanctions over its nuclear programme. Any conflict is likely to worsen this situation significantly. Israel is poised to similarly suffer. With the economy already strained by the ongoing conflict in Gaza, a broader war with Iran could potentially push costs to $120 billion or 20% of GDP. The Israeli shekel currency has dropped nearly 2% against the dollar.

Region: While the prospect of a broader regional conflict would introduce significant economic implications, several effects have already been witnessed. One of the first sectors to be impacted by the attacks is aviation. All flights at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport have been suspended and flights heading for Tel Aviv were diverted. Reports have also emerged indicating that Tabriz Shahid Madani International Airport was destroyed by Israeli strikes. Israeli, Iranian, Iraqi, and Jordanian airspace were all closed in response to the attacks due to the fear that a civilian aircraft could be shot down. Although these measures were necessary, rerouting flights is expensive as it increases journey times and results in planes requiring additional fuel. Fears of further retaliatory attacks by Iran have forced Israeli airlines to relocate some of their planes overseas from Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport.

Oil prices spiked after the Israeli strikes, with the benchmark Brent Crude and NYMEX Light Sweet up by more than 8%. Additionally, Asian and European stock markets declined at the open, while the S&P 500 and Nasdaq futures were down by nearly 1.5%. Traders are concerned that conflict in the energy-rich region will disrupt supplies, resulting in less oil availability. On the contrary, energy stocks rallied, along with defence companies such as Lockheed Martin, Rheinmetall, and BAE, which spiked between 2-3%.

An all-out war between Israel and Iran could disrupt energy markets and trade routes with significant global repercussions. As a major global oil-producing region, any disruption to shipping would be extremely detrimental. Iran possesses the capacity to close the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime chokepoint through which 20–25% of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments flow.  If Tehran closed the waterway, oil prices could rise even higher as oil tankers would be stranded. Another maritime chokepoint, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, could also be implicated should the Houthis, a Yemeni Iranian-backed proxy, choose to attack ships travelling through the Red Sea. The world received a glimpse of the economic consequences of such actions when the Houthis targeted cargo ships travelling through the waterway. Shipping costs rose sharply as a result of vessels having to reroute around the Horn of Africa.

Social Impact – HIGH

Iran: The Iranian regime maintains a tight grip on power through strict control and brutal repression of opponents. As an authoritarian state with draconian laws concerning human rights, media censorship, and suppressing political opposition, discontent among the repressed population is widespread. This has only worsened as a result of the challenging economic landscape. Since the Israeli strikes, Iranian officials have warned of legal action against individuals spreading “false content” or “disturbing public psychological security”. This language is often used as justification for crackdowns on media and online activity. According to Reporters Without Borders, Iran is one of the world’s biggest jailers of journalists. Iranian authorities are likely preparing to tighten controls even further and a crackdown in the short term is likely as the regime fears for its survival.

Civil unrest and protests against the Iranian regime have occurred before. One notable instance was the demonstrations that broke out following the death in custody of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who had been arrested by morality police for violating strict rules requiring women to cover their hair. The ensuing protests and government crackdown resulted in over 500 deaths and 20,000 detentions. Should the population feel the regime is vulnerable, mass mobilisation could occur, posing a substantial threat to the regime. In all likelihood, civil unrest will be met with violence from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, who will resort to increasingly desperate methods as the threat grows.

Israel: In Israel, a growing number of people have grown weary of constant war and recent polls discovered that 61% of Israelis wanted the war in Gaza to end. Past protests have seen tens of thousands of protestors take to the streets in opposition to Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition government and the ongoing war in Gaza. A further escalation by pursuing a conflict with Iran is likely to be viewed by many as Netanyahu prolonging the fighting to protect his political interests. With his coalition government being propped up by right-wing lawmakers interested in escalating the war, appeasing the more extreme members, such as Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, is a political necessity. Analysts have also pointed to the importance of Netanyahu’s court cases, including breach of trust, fraud, and bribery, as motivating Israel’s ongoing military campaigns. The court postponed Netanyahu’s hearings by 14 months because of the fighting and reduced his testimony from 3 times to 2 times per week. Then, when Israel broke the ceasefire in March 2025, judicial proceedings were postponed again. Some analysts have even raised concerns that Netanyahu could use the war to delay the next election, scheduled to take place in 2026.

Forecast 

• Whilst Israeli strikes against Iranian targets are highly likely to continue over the 24-48 hours, their long-term impact remains uncertain.

• Operation Rising Lion was likely conducted to comprehensively eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities: an aim American policymakers would likely have rather achieved through diplomatic efforts.

• The operation’s scale marks a notable escalation from previous clashes, elevating the likelihood of an all-out war erupting between Israel and Iran.

• Current estimates suggest that Israel would likely achieve victory against Iran in a direct military confrontation.

• In this scenario, Tehran would either be forced to sue for peace, a move which would risk provoking public backlash on account of appearing weak against Israeli aggression, or initiating total war, which would risk the emergence of a wider regional conflict and the collapse of the regime due to external military and economic pressure.

• Israel appears resolutely committed to destroying Iran’s nuclear capabilities and implementing regime change: objectives which can be achieved either through direct miliary action or the creation of domestic instability.

• Unless American officials can pressure Netanyahu to de-escalate and encourage the resumption of negotiations with Iran, both of which appear unlikely based on current assessments, strikes are assessed as highly likely to continue over the coming weeks.