Iran’s Civil Unrest Returns - How do current events differ to 2022 Mahsa Amini uprisings?

Key Takeaways:

• In January 2026, Iran remains caught up in experiencing its most significant anti-government uprising since 2022.

• On 28 December 2025, following the collapse of the rial to 1.42 million per USD, protesters took to the streets in Tehran's Grand Bazaar, actions which quickly spread across the country and have reached 111 cities across all 31 provinces as of 08 January 2026.

• Security forces (IRGC, Basij, LEF) have used force, including live ammunition and hospital raids; protest activity has been geographically diffuse, extending to peripheral regions and stretching the capacity of security forces across multiple locations.

• As in earlier protest waves (2017–18, 2019, 2022), economic triggers have evolved into explicit anti-regime mobilisation, with strong participation from Gen-Z and university students.

• The protests resemble the 2022 Mahsa Amini (“Woman, Life, Freedom”) movement in scope, social breadth and political character, though the current wave is more dispersed geographically, which heightens regime-stability risk.

• In global markets, the unrest has added a geopolitical risk premium to oil and energy commodities, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, leading to short-term volatility and price spikes.

• However, strong global supply and resilient producer output have so far prevented a sustained surge, meaning commodity impacts remain risk-perception driven rather than supply-disruptive.

  
  

Contextual Analysis:

The current wave of protests began on 28 December 2025, when the Iranian rial  collapsed to 1.42 million per US dollar, marking a 56% loss in six months. This triggered demonstrations among currency traders and shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar and quickly spread nationwide. By 08 January 2026, protests had been recorded in 111 cities across all 31 provinces, including Tehran, Isfahan, Lorestan, Fars, Kermanshah, and Sistan-Baluchestan. Human rights data indicate that up to 36 protesters have been killed and over 2,000 arrested as security forces intensify crackdowns.

The unrest reflects more than economic distress and deaths: since the December 2017 – January 2018 protests, Iranian demonstrations have repeatedly escalated from economic triggers into explicit anti-regime mobilisation, as also seen in November 2019 and during the 2022 ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ uprising following the death of Mahsa Amini. The current movement is notable for the visibility of Gen-Z and university students, echoing earlier youth-led mobilisation in late 2022. Examples include student demonstrations at Tehran University and Sharif University (29–31 December 2025) and night-time street rallies in Karaj, Shiraz, and Ahvaz. Unlike earlier unrest concentrated in urban cores, these protests are geographically diffuse, extending to peripheral and minority regions such as Lorestan, Kurdistan, and Khuzestan. There are indications of at least 111 cities experiencing protest activity, and the unrest has taken on increasing number of political slogans and broader social grievance frames.

On 30–31 December 2025, (short after the start of the protests), at least ten protesters were confirmed killed, including Amirhesam Khodayarifard  in Kuhdasht, Lorestan, and Ahmad Jalil in Lordegan, Chaharmahal-Bakhtiari, according to Hengaw and HRANA. This dispersion increases the regime’s stabilisation burden by stretching the capacity of the IRGC, Basij, and LEF police units across multiple theatres simultaneously.

Comparison with Mahsa Amini Uprisings of 2022

This section compares the current protest wave, driven by the collapse of the Iranian rial, with the 2022 Mahsa Amini uprising. By examining their similarities and differences in causes, participation, and state response, the analysis draws conclusions about how protest dynamics in Iran have evolved and what they reveal about regime stability today.                                               

Grievances and Participation

Current Protests:

Protesters moved into every major city in Iran; from bazaar merchants to university students, to workers and regular citizens.

Amini Protests: Nationwide protests were seen; from province to province, campus to campus, and metropolis to metropolis; all of these protests were attended by a broad spectrum of Iranians.

Similarities: Both protests waves expanded far beyond their original flashpoints and included much of Iranian society; this is not limited to the localised concerns of an area. The two protests share similar economic and social concerns. The protesters have expressed their frustration with the instability of the rial (currency); the protesters also expressed their dissatisfaction with the governments and clergy's management; however, in addition to their economic frustrations the protesters have also expressed their political dissatisfaction.

Although the Mahsa Amini protests were initially sparked by her death and the right to wear whatever they want, the protests quickly began to address other political concerns, such as the mandatory hijab and the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.

State Response:

Current Protests:

As a result of the current protests, the government of Iran has sent its its security forces; there have been violent clashes between the security forces and the protesters; and the government has offered some concessions (such as reform talks or new appointments) but has also spoken out against the "rioters".

Mahsa Amini Protests: Iranian security forces responded similarly; the security forces used force, arrested thousands of people; shut down the Internet; and reported that hundreds of people died and were abused in connection with the protests.

Similarities: The government of Iran has used violence and repression on the protesters and at the same time has attempted to show that the protests are not legitimate and are instead inspired by foreign influence.

Business Implications: Commodities Influenced by Increased Geopolitical Risks

Commodities are essential productive inputs (such as oil, gold, wheat or copper) that are present in everyday production and consumption processes. Despite being less popular than stocks or bonds, they can be highly profitable, as shown by IShares Diversified Commodity Swap ETF, which has returned 62,4% cumulatively over five years.

The perception of high volatility is largely due to the high leverage typically used in commodity investing and short-term inelasticity of supply which amplifies price movements.

Commodity prices follow cycles: they rise when demand grows, and supply is limited, which later encourages delayed investment in production capacity, eventually leading to oversupply and price declines.

Geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, and particularly around Iran, have introduced a geopolitical risk premium into commodity markets, especially crude oil, as traders price in the possibility of supply disruptions around key chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. While the immediate market reaction has included heightened volatility and occasional price spikes in oil and energy commodities, the underlying global oil market fundamentals — including oversupply and resilient flows from other producers — have moderated the extent of any sustained price surge. This dynamic illustrates how geopolitical crisis fears can briefly rattle commodity prices but may not fundamentally alter long-term supply-demand trajectories unless disruptions are prolonged or physically constrict export flows.

The Aftermath of Amini:

The protests after Mahsa Amini’s death (2022–23) did affect Iranian commodities and the broader economy, but the impacts were largely indirect and structural rather than immediate changes in commodity markets in the way you might expect for, say, a sudden trade shock. Here are the key ways that Mahsa Amini’s protests influenced Iranian commodities and economic conditions:

1. Escalation of Pre-existing Economic Strains

Iran’s economy already faced high inflation and a weakening currency before the protests. During 2022–23, inflation exceeded 50 percent, and the rial had already been depreciating sharply; factors which affected prices of food, fuel, and imported goods. The protests overlapped with these trends and are widely understood not to have caused them, but rather to have highlighted and intensified public awareness of economic hardship.

2. Disruption of Domestic Economic Activity

The widespread scale of the Mahsa Amini protests interrupted normal commercial activity in many cities. Strikes, road blockages, and social unrest tend to reduce sales, slow production, and disrupt distribution networks — meaning commodities exchange and supply chains slowed or became unpredictable during peak protest periods. According to analyses of the protests’ economic effects, such widespread unrest temporarily depresses economic output when large segments of workers and businesses participate in or avoid activity.

3. Further Pressure on Inflation and Currency

While the protests did not directly set commodity prices, they added to pressure on Iran’s currency stability and economic confidence, which are key drivers of commodity price inflation in Iran’s internal markets. The The depreciation of the rial — which makes imported goods and commodities more expensive — continued through 2022 and afterward, contributing to rising prices for essentials like food and fuel during and after the protests.

4. Sanctions and Trade Constraints

The protests also intersected with ongoing economic sanctions, which restrict Iran’s ability to export oil and import goods. These sanctions constrain commodity exports — particularly oil, Iran’s largest export — and magnify the effect of market disruptions and political unrest on domestic prices. Though the protests didn’t cause sanctions, they occurred within a sanctions-shaped economy, intensifying economic dislocation that affected commodity markets.

5. Long-term Investor and Market Confidence Effects

The political uncertainty associated with the Mahsa Amini protests affected investor confidence and long-term economic planning, which indirectly influences commodity markets such as construction materials, metals, and energy. If businesses anticipate instability and capital flight, they delay investment and reduce production, which can tighten supply and feed into inflationary pressures.

The Mahsa Amini protests did not directly “move” commodity prices in a standalone shock, but they exacerbated an already fragile economic environment marked by inflation, currency volatility, and sanctions pressures. Those structural issues (rather than the protests alone) are what drove changes in the costs of goods, fuel, food staples, and other commodities in Iran’s domestic markets during this period.