Lines in the Sand: Impacts and Challenges of Energy Co-operation Between Syria and Türkiye

Executive Summary:

• An energy cooperation agreement between Syria and Türkiye presents new opportunities for energy supply chain diversification within the Middle East.

• The reopening of the Kirkuk–Baniyas oil pipeline and construction of a 400-kilovolt transmission line will likely foster closer energy and political cooperation between Türkiye and Syria.

• Türkiye is likely to perceive the dissolution of the PKK as an opportunity to expand energy and security activity within the Türkiye-Syria border region.

• Sectarian violence and Israeli incursions threaten internal security within Syria, posing potential deterrents to foreign investors.

Kirkuk–Baniyas Pipeline Restoration:

On 25 April 2025, Iraqi delegates met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to discuss the restoration of an Iraqi pipeline which would connect the country’s oil production facilities to Syria’s Mediterranean ports. The Iraqi delegation, led by the head of the National Intelligence Service Hamid Al-Shatri, also discussed counter-terrorism cooperation, border security and the expansion of bilateral trade with Syrian counterparts.

The pipeline, which runs from the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Baniyas, has been rendered non-operational since 2003. This project indicates the Syrian government’s desire to shift away from the country’s previous energy model, which was historically characterised by a heavy dependence on Iranian resources. According to estimates by the Atlantic Council, Syria received approximately 100,000 barrels of Iranian oil per day under previous ruler Bashar al-Assad. However, a combination of factors including the desire to demonstrate clear political differences from the Assad regime, Iran’s perceived unreliability as a strategic energy partner, and al-Sharaa’s emphasis on prioritising regional cooperation with the Gulf States means that this model is highly unlikely to be continued moving forward.

New Routes for Energy Trade:

From Iraq’s perspective, cooperation with Syria presents significant opportunities to expand energy exports, which already doubled in value from 2023-2024. If successful, this partnership may also be viewed as a template for other regional producers such as Kuwait or Jordan to diversify their own export routes via Syrian pipelines and refineries. The renewed threat of Houthi attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb strait and continued naval tensions in the Strait of Hormuz may present an overland option as an attractive alternative for Gulf States, whose primary export routes depend heavily on these volatile chokepoints.

Meanwhile, neighbouring states Türkiye and Lebanon are highly likely to demonstrate interest in partnering with Syria as importers, with the Turkish government exploring the possibility of joint pipeline construction as early as December 2024. In May 2025, both the Syrian and Turkish governments confirmed that an energy import deal will soon be agreed between the two countries. Under the new agreement, Türkiye will provide electricity via a 400-kilovolt transmission line connecting the Reyhanli and Harem regions, and assist with the construction of a 6 million cubic metre per day natural gas pipeline connecting the cities of Kilis and Aleppo.

If such projects are completed successfully, international governments may become incentivise to remove their designation of HTS as a terrorist organisation, a factor which has thus far prevented the Syrian economy from growing past the constraints imposed by sanctions.

Strategic Implications:

Türkiye has pursued a significant expansion of influence following the collapse of the Assad regime. The power vacuum created by the regime’s collapse has been viewed largely as a positive development by Ankara, whose backing of President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s HTS movement is assessed to contribute heavily towards the group’s eventual rise to power. The recent dissolution of the PKK militia group may present new opportunities to transport energy through southern Turkey: a region previously prone to sabotage and terrorist attacks from pro-Kurdish militias. This combination of support for the Syrian coalition and a decreased risk of domestic terror attacks places Turkey in a strong position to expand its regional influence further, and present itself as a viable alternative for European states seeking to reduce energy imports from Russia.

Syria, meanwhile, will likely pursue a cautiously pragmatic approach regarding energy diplomacy. A renewed ability to export oil will undoubtedly be viewed by the ruling coalition as a critical method of facilitating post-war reconstruction, which remains the country’s top political priority. Türkiye’s political support and offer of construction expertise means that closer alignment between the two countries will almost certainly develop following their energy deal. However, President al-Sharaa will likely remain wary of developing overreliance on Turkish support, and may seek to also involve states from the Gulf and Europe with reconstruction projects.

v

Challenges Ahead:

News of cooperation between Syria and Iraq is likely to be noted with discomfort by pro-Iranian militant actors, who may attempt to stage sabotage operations aimed at either extorting economic concessions or protesting the political and economic isolation of Iran should renovation works commence. However, given the present weakness of Iran’s proxy militia network, this is currently assessed as a relatively low risk.

The war in Ukraine has made Türkiye an indispensable economic and security partner for Europe, granting President Erdogan greater license to operate using increasingly authoritarian practices which may otherwise have sparked condemnation. Should this extend into Turkish military units being deployed to northern Syria, heavy clashes are highly likely to erupt with local militia groups.

Moreover, worsening intercommunal violence between Sunni, Druze, and Alawite communities has posed serious question marks regarding Syrian government’s stance on religious tolerance, and President al-Sharaa’s ability to control more hardline coalition members. The Israel Defence Force’s (IDF) repeated incursions into western Syria from the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon may also galvanise Syrian public opinion against Israel, and lead to more hardline coalition partners gaining more political support and power. Should these trends continue, international partners may become increasingly unwilling to invest in Syrian reconstruction projects for political reasons. This would pose significant constraints on Syria’s ability to export oil, and for the diversification of the region’s energy supply networks.

For further information on how this development could impact your business, please contact Global Situational Awareness at gsoc@global-sa.co.uk.