Sectarian Spiral - Al-Sharaa's Syria Faces Looming Threat of Worsening Intercommunal Violence

Key Takeaways:

• Sectarian violence between Druze and Bedouin communities in Suwayda has killed at least 594 residents since 13 July 2025, exposing the significant fragility of Syria’s internal security landscape.

• Prime Minister Netanyahu's strikes against Syrian government targets represent a significant escalation driven by domestic political survival needs, with cross-border ground operations and long-range strikes likely to intensify in the short-to-medium term.

• President Al-Sharaa's recent diplomatic achievements are threatened by his coalition's inability to control hardline militias and establish legitimate security institutions, creating operational risks for businesses considering Syrian market re-entry or regional investments.

• Ankara's critical backing of President al-Sharaa and concerns over Kurdish separatism mean that Türkiye may pressure Syria for military intervention if violence spreads to northern Kurdish regions, causing potential disruptions along Turkish-Syrian trade corridors and energy transit routes.

• Developments in Suwayda are likely to compound existing aviation sector uncertainties in the region, with air traffic likely to witness continued disruptions near the Syria-Israel border in the short to medium term

• Israeli military intervention may push President al-Sharaa to abandon normalisation efforts, potentially reshaping regional trade partnerships and investment flows while reinforcing perceptions of Israel as an aggressor state.

Suwayda Crisis: Context and Timeline

Over the past week, intercommunal clashes in the southwestern city of Suwayda have laid bare the significant levels of socio-political instability which continue to plague President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Syria. In recent months, Alawite communities have been primarily targeted by violent attacks by Sunni militants due to the group’s historic association with the brutal practices maintained and enforced by the Assad regime. However, recent developments have shifted the focus of violence onto Syria’s Druze community: a minority ethnic group whose unique religious practices and insular nature mark a distinct separation from the country’s majority Sunni population.  

On 13 July 2025, violent clashes erupted in Suwayda after a Druze merchant was allegedly kidnaped by a group of Bedouins whilst travelling to Damascus. As of 18 July 2025, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) has documented the deaths of at least 594 residents, including six children and nine women, and at least 436 injuries.

In response, Syrian government forces deployed several columns of tanks to Suwayda on 15 July 2025 in an attempt to quell the unrest. These columns were subsequently targeted by Israeli strikes, allegedly in an attempt to demilitarise the area and protect the city’s Druze community from future attacks. Separately, Israel conducted a series of air strikes against central Damascus, hitting a compound housing the Ministry of Defence and areas near the presidential palace. These attacks warranted strong condemnation from the Syrian government, who denounced the strikes as a “dangerous escalation” and accused Israel of pursuing a “deliberate policy to inflame tensions, spread chaos, and undermine security and stability in Syria”. On 16 July 2025, the Syrian government announced a 14-point ceasefire proposal to end hostilities in Suwayda, with President al-Sharaa reaffirming commitments to “protecting Druze rights and freedoms”.

However, only one day after the withdrawal of Syrian government forces on 17 July 2025, violence resumed in Suwayda, with video footage showing gun battles between Druze and Bedouin militants. Israel has confirmed its intention to “allow Syrian government intervention in the Suwayda Governorate over the next 48 hours”, whilst indications suggest that the Syrian Ministry of the Interior soon intends to remobilise and redeploy units to Suwayda to restore order.

Domestic Stability Rests on Razor’s Edge

After achieving a notable diplomatic victory in having sanctions removed by both the United States and United Kingdom last week, President al-Sharaa will view recent developments in Suwayda with grave alarm. Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, President al-Sharaa’s ruling coalition has struggled to implement robust and legitimate security institutions capable of controlling and demobilising the varied patchwork of militias still active throughout the country. Sunni populations, many of whom suffered intense persecution under Assad’s rule, remain strongly divided in their visions for a post-Assad Syria.

Whilst several Sunni groups espouse moderate views regarding religious tolerance, others view the power vacuum left by Assad as an opportunity to exact long-awaited revenge against minority groups perceived to be either heretical or loyal to the old regime. Al-Sharaa has placed heavy rhetorical emphasis on inclusive peacebuilding efforts, likely in a bid to reassure the international community that despite his movement’s jihadist roots, the Syrian government remains a reliable partner with whom business can be conducted. However, the past several months have shown al-Sharaa’s struggle to control more extremist elements of his coalition and inability to protect minority groups against reprisal attacks.

Such attacks have been particularly targeted against the Alawite community, of which former President Assad was a member. Between 06-08 March 2025, human rights organisations reported that as many as 1,300 people were killed in major sectarian attacks. These attacks were concentrated primarily in the coastal regions of Latakia and Tartus, both of which contain significant proportions of Alawite residents. Moreover, recent reports from Reuters journalists suggest that at least 16 Alawite women have been abducted and held for ransom, with demanded payments reportedly ranging from USD $1,500 to USD $100,000 in value. However, the most notorious example of religious violence was witnessed on 22 June 2025, when a Sunni extremist killed 23 Christian worshipers and wounded 63 in a suicide attack conducted against Damascus’ Greek Orthodox Church of the Prophet Elias. Such examples highlight the Syrian government’s inability or unwillingness to ensure security for minority groups, a trend which has fostered growing anxiety within Syria’s Kurdish, Yazidi, and Shia communities.

The Israel Factor

A notable factor distinguishing the Suwayda crisis from other examples of intercommunal violence is the direct involvement of the Israeli military: a development which could have profound impacts for both Syria and the Middle East. In addition to the targeting of Syrian government forces in Suwayda, an operation ostensibly conducted to protect Druze residents, strikes against high-profile government targets in Damascus have been perceived as a serious violation of Syria’s sovereignty.

Israel’s motivations likely stem from its internal political dynamics, which have destabilised significantly in recent days. Namely, in the past week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ruling coalition has lost the support of both the United Torah Judaism (UTJ) and Shas parties: two ultra-Orthodox movements who withdrew from the coalition to protest proposals to conscript ultra-Orthodox yeshiva scholars into the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). This leaves Netanyahu with the options of running a minority government, controlling only 50 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, or collapsing the coalition entirely.

Several analysts have suggested that Netanyahu’s primary motivation is to ensure his own political survival, and that the Prime Minister has repeatedly used military conflicts to distract Israeli public opinion from domestic political crises. In the event that Netanyahu loses power, the leader is likely to be placed on trial and found guilty of corruption and other abuses of power. As such, events in Syria have likely been viewed as an appealing opportunity to repeat the tactics which have thus far proven successful in securing his political position. In the short to medium term, this will likely result in cross-border ground operations being staged in the Golan Heights, and long-range strikes being conducted against strategic targets throughout Syria.

Within Syria, repeated provocations by Israel are assessed as likely to embolden more hardline anti-Israel factions within al-Sharaa’s governing coalition. This will pose significant challenges to the president’s ambition of normalising relations between Syria and Israel, which he has likely pursued in an attempt to attract investment from western nations. However, internal political pressures and mounting national security concerns may prompt a reversal of this policy, and instead prompt al-Sharaa to prioritise the improvement of relations with other Gulf states opposed to Israel’s ongoing military activities.

Regional Implications

Emboldened by the diplomatic “carte-blanche” granted by US President Donald Trump, Israel may feel empowered to stage further military incursions into Syrian territory over the next several weeks. Despite the re-emergence of intercommunal clashes at a local level, the majority of Syria’s population remains opposed to war due to the traumatic legacy of the past 14 years. Israel may attempt to exploit this sentiment in a bid to solidify its strategic footprint within the Middle East using military force, a move which would reinforce regional perceptions of Israel as an untrustworthy aggressor and rogue state.

Türkiye remains particularly alert to the threat of both intercommunal violence and Israeli military expansion. Ankara’s backing of President al-Sharaa is assessed to have played a significant role in the leader’s ascent to power, and continues to remain a critical factor in ensuring the regime’s present survival. Moreover, the recent dissolution of the PKK, a Kurdish separatist militia who repeatedly staged terrorist attacks against Turkish targets, is assessed as likely to contribute to President Erdogan’s increasingly total control over Turkey’s political landscape. Should Kurdish communities in northern Syria witness attacks similar to those incurred by Druze or Alawite groups in recent months, Erdogan is likely to apply significant pressure against President al-Sharaa to intervene in a bid to prevent further Kurdish separatist sentiments from developing within Türkiye.

Iran, meanwhile, remains largely unable to mobilise its previously wide-reaching influence within Syria or defend its proxy militias against Israeli military operations. In the aftermath of Operation Rising Lion, Iran’s defence capabilities have suffered significant damage, with the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen remaining the lone active pillar in a once feared network of proxy militias. However, recent developments within Syria are likely to prompt Iranian authorities to accelerate the development of nuclear weapons. Whilst Tehran insists that such capabilities are essential in securing the regime against existential threats, such as the one posed by Israel, this policy will likely exacerbate regional security tensions to a significant extent throughout the Middle East.