Sudan: Relations With UAE Deteriorate Amid Civil War and Proxy Power Struggles

Key Takeaways

• The breakdown of diplomatic relations between Sudan and the UAE marks a significant shift from a historically strong economic partnership.

• The Sudanese army accuses the UAE of actively supporting the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and mercenaries, which the UAE continuously denies.

• The involvement of external actors is likely to escalate the conflict, potentially pulling in other regional powers and prolonging the humanitarian crisis.

• The UAE's alleged involvement in the conflict is believed to be driven by its economic interests in Sudan's resources, as well as its strategic goals in the Red Sea.

The Shift from Cooperation to Conflict: The Sudan/UAE Diplomatic Fallout

Over the years, the relationship between Sudan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has grown from cordial and cooperative to a tense and fraught one, mainly due to the ongoing civil war in Sudan. The Sudanese army has repeatedly accused the UAE of supplying advanced weaponry, including drones, to its enemy, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). On 06 August 2025, the Sudanese Air Force said it shot down an Emirati aircraft suspected of transporting mercenaries and equipment intended for the RSF as it landed in Nyala in Darfur. According to the army, the airstrike killed at least 40 mercenaries and destroyed shipments of weapons as it came through the Nyala Airport. Sudan’s foreign ministry said in a statement that the Sudanese government has “irrefutable evidence” confirming mercenaries from Colombia and some neighbouring African countries were sponsored and financed by Emirati authorities. In response, the UAE reportedly banned Sudanese planes from landing at its airports. The UAE also barred a Sudanese airliner from taking off from Abu Dhabi airport. On 05 August 2025, the Security and Defence Council announced that it had severed diplomatic relations with the UAE and recalled its embassy staff from Abu Dhabi, declaring the UAE an “aggressor".  Abu Dhabi denies the accusations of its support of the RSF, despite numerous reports of its involvement from United Nations experts, US officials and international organisations.

The UAE’s Economic and Strategic Interests in Sudan

Prior to the recent diplomatic fallout, the UAE had played a significant role in Sudan’s economy. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity, Sudan exported gold, oily seeds and forage crops totalling US$1.09 billion to the UAE in 2023. The UAE, on the other hand, exported US$861 million of jewellery, refined petroleum and raw sugar to Sudan that same year. Since the early 2010s, the UAE has been the primary buyer of Sudanese gold. Emiral Resources, a Dubai-registered Russian-Emirati company, has been active in Sudan’s gold mining sector through its subsidiary, Alliance for Mining Co. Ltd., since 2014. The UAE is also believed to control several land and farming operations in Sudan. For example, the International Holding Company (IHC), the UAE’s largest listed corporation, and Jenaan Investment are farming more than 50,000 hectares in Sudan.

Within the banking sector, the UAE’s influence can be clearly seen. In March 2018, it was reported that the UAE channelled US$7.6 billion to Sudan’s central bank, in private investments and funding provided through the Abu Dhabi Fund For Development. Under former President Omar al-Bashir, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank became the first foreign bank to open in Sudan in 2012.  Following the outbreak of the civil war, both the RSF and SAF scrambled to control the state and its financial resources. At the onset of the conflict, the RSF moved to capture the currency printing house and the Sudan Gold Refinery in Khartoum, which held an estimated 1.3 tonnes of unrefined gold with a value estimated at US$150 million, ready for export. The RSF also reportedly quickly retook control of Jebel Amer, which was once a major gold-producing area in North Darfur. Both groups wanted to maintain their grip on their powers and resources as the conflict escalated. Under Bashir’s regime, the RSF commanders’ privately-owned companies developed partnerships with foreign companies, while also offering profitable deals to SAF-controlled companies, including with Russian-controlled subsidiaries of the Wagner Group.

From Friends to Foes

In April 2023, Sudan entered a civil war after a power struggle between the SAF and the RSF paramilitary group in the capital, Khartoum. The war arose after deepening tensions between the former allies since the ousting of President al-Bashir in 2019. The SAF and RSF jointly carried out the 2019 coup, which led to the establishment of a civilian-military transitional government. However, Abdalla Hamdok, who was serving as prime minister, was overthrown in October 2021 and resigned in January 2022 due to political deadlock and widespread protests. The SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, signed a framework deal to facilitate a two-year civilian-led transition towards elections. However, the intense rivalry between the two groups hampered Sudan's transition efforts. Fierce fighting between the two sides erupted in April 2023 in Khartoum, marking the beginning of the civil war. The RSF accused the army of attacking its forces in South Khartoum, seizing the city's airport, and controlling the country's presidential palace. The Sudanese army otherwise claimed that fighting broke out after RSF troops tried to attack its forces in the southern part of the capital. The military called the RSF a “rebel force,” describing the paramilitary’s statements as "lies".

The Human Cost of War

Since the war began in April 2023, over 150,000 people have lost their lives, and over 14 million have been forced from their homes, according to the Norwegian Refugee Council. In January 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Karim Khan warned the UN Security Council that both government forces and the RSF may be committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide in Darfur. A report published by Human Rights Watch revealed that the RSF and their allied militias carried out attacks against the ethnic Masalit and other non-Arab groups in El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur state, from April to June 2023, with attacks intensifying in November that same year. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed Sudan’s lawsuit accusing Abu Dhabi of “complicity in genocide” in the western Darfur province over its alleged support for the RSF.

Strategic Drivers of the UAE’s Alleged Involvement

The UAE’s alleged involvement in the conflict could largely be linked with its interest in Sudan’s agricultural and mineral resources, particularly gold. Most of the gold produced in Sudan is smuggled out of the country, usually passing through transit routes in Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Sudan before reaching the UAE. The UAE also has major interests in the Red Sea. In 2024, Sudan cancelled a US$6 billion deal with the UAE to develop the Abu Amama port and linked enterprise zone on the Red Sea coast. The deal would have seen Abu Dhabi's AD Ports Group and Dubai-based Invictus Investment build and operate the Abu Amama seaport, located about 200km north of Port Sudan, which would be linked by road. An RSF win in the conflict would boost the UAE's control over regional trade and solidify its position as a major maritime power.

The Escalation of a Growing Proxy Conflict and Heightened Risks for Travel and Business in Sudan

The icy relationship between the UAE and Sudan is unlikely to thaw anytime soon, particularly as the conflict intensifies. The severing of ties and public accusations will likely intensify the existing conflict in Sudan. The SAF will intensify its military campaign against the RSF, viewing the UAE as a hostile state. This will likely lead to a protracted and even more violent conflict, with both sides receiving support from external powers. Countries like Egypt and Turkey may increase their support for the SAF to counter the perceived influence of the UAE, while the UAE’s allies, including Russia, may increase their support for the RSF.

Several Western governments have already issued strong travel warnings against using Sudanese airports, especially Port Sudan, due to security risks. Intensified fighting, especially in areas such as Khartoum and Darfur, raises the likelihood of direct or indirect harm to personnel and assets. Diplomatic tensions between Sudan and the UAE, along with the presence of foreign fighters, signal an unstable and unpredictable security landscape. Rising diplomatic friction between Sudan and the UAE, compounded by the involvement of foreign fighters, highlights a volatile and unpredictable security environment".

Due to the ongoing conflict, all non-essential travel to Sudan is strongly advised against. However, if a business must continue operating due to critical business needs, please contact Global Situational Awareness at gsoc@global-sa.co.uk for further information on how this development may impact your travel or business operations. Our technology enhances organisational travel and intelligence operations, ensuring duty of care and effective crisis incident management at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It offers a comprehensive 360-degree common operating picture, empowering informed decision-making based on intelligence. Key elements for safeguarding your personnel and assets include identifying employee location, locating facilities, offices, and assets and monitoring adverse events that could pose risks to individuals, assets, and your organisation.