The End of Total Peace: Colombia's New President and an Old War

Key Takeaways:

• Colombia's "Total Peace" strategy under Petro failed to reduce armed group activity, rebel numbers nearly doubled to roughly 27,000 fighters by 2026, and 2025 became one of the deadliest years in a decade.

• Abelardo De La Espriella won the presidency on 21 June by less than one percentage point, pledging a 90-day military offensive and an end to all peace talks.

• Armed groups remain deeply entrenched, with the ELN, Gulf Clan, and FARC dissidents controlling hundreds of municipalities, raising doubts over whether force alone can dislodge them.

• A minority government and a near-evenly split electorate limit De La Espriella's ability to sustain a prolonged security campaign, risking escalation without resolution.

• Businesses face elevated exposure to conflict disruption, extortion, kidnapping, and human rights-linked reputational risk.

A Decades-Long War, A Failed Peace

Colombia's internal conflict traces its roots to the 1960s, when rural poverty, land inequality, and political exclusion gave rise to left-wing guerrilla movements. The FARC and the ELN were both founded in that decade, fuelled by grievances over land and a lack of state presence across vast swathes of Colombian territory. Decades of fighting between the state, guerrillas, and right-wing paramilitary groups killed more than 220,000 people and displaced millions. A 2016 peace accord formally ended the FARC conflict, but dissident factions rejected it, and the ELN continued fighting, leaving a power vacuum that armed groups rapidly filled.

When Gustavo Petro took office in 2022, his answer was "Total Peace". Ceasefires and dialogue with all armed actors from FARC dissidents and the ELN to criminal organisations such as the Gulf Clan. The strategy failed to deliver. Negotiations largely stalled, and armed groups used ceasefires to expand their territorial control rather than reduce it. By the time of the 2026 elections, analysts assessed that rebel group numbers had nearly doubled to approximately 27,000 fighters since Petro took office. Despite Petro's strategy, 2025 was marked by one of the worst humanitarian tolls in a decade, with the run-up to elections marred by violence including the assassination of congressman and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay.

A New President, A New Strategy

On 21 June, Abelardo De La Espriella — a far-right criminal defence lawyer and political outsider — defeated left-wing senator Iván Cepeda in a runoff by less than one percentage point. Endorsed by President Trump, who declared on Truth Social "He Won, BIG!", De La Espriella campaigned on military confrontation over dialogue. He has promised to launch a 90-day military offensive against armed groups, end all peace talks, and build mega-prisons modelled on those in El Salvador. Speaking to Reuters earlier this year, De La Espriella was unambiguous: "In my government, there will be no peace processes." His logic is explicit: "If we have security, we will have investors, because there will be confidence to invest."

Entrenched Enemies, Fragile Mandate

The optimism embedded in De La Espriella's platform collides with a difficult reality. The ELN guerrilla operates in 232 municipalities, the Gulf Clan in 392, and FARC dissidents in 299. These are not forces that dissolve in response to a 90-day military offensive. Experts are sceptical. Former Colombian government official and ambassador Luis Carlos Villegas has warned that "security cannot be restored by giving an order," noting it requires "time and knowledge, as well as international cooperation" and cannot be divorced from social and economic issues that are "highly urgent, complex, and costly."

There are also structural constraints. De La Espriella won by less than one percentage point and holds a minority in Congress, making sustained security legislation difficult without building coalitions across a deeply polarised legislature. The risk is a government that escalates military operations without the institutional capacity to sustain them, triggering retaliatory violence without achieving lasting security gains.

Business Implications

Colombia remains a significant economy, a major exporter of oil, coal, coffee, and flowers, with a strategic role in Latin American trade. But the security transition carries direct operational implications. The most immediate risk is conflict escalation. A military offensive against entrenched, territorially embedded armed groups is likely to generate a violent response, disrupting supply chains, road access, and infrastructure in rural areas where armed group presence is highest.

Extortion risk also remains acute. Nearly half of all extortion cases in Colombia are orchestrated remotely, often from within prisons, with armed groups including the ELN, FARC dissidents, and the Gulf Clan targeting businesses across mining, construction, retail, and other industries. In rural regions, extortion is so deeply embedded that some communities consider it an unavoidable cost of doing business. The broader picture of insecurity is worsening. Colombia's Ministry of Defence registered 651 kidnappings for ransom in 2025, a 108% increase from the previous year.

Human rights exposure is a growing concern for multinationals operating in Colombia. The UN has consistently documented killings of social leaders in communities where extractive, agricultural, and environmental companies operate. The link between corporate activity and violence is increasingly being scrutinised. In 2026, workers linked to Nestlé and Seatech International were among those requiring protection from Colombia's National Protection Unit following threats connected to labour disputes, a signal that international brands are not insulated from the country's human rights crisis.

Finally, the political uncertainty created by a minority government pursuing a confrontational agenda should factor into longer-term planning. The gap between De La Espriella's campaign promises and what he can realistically deliver may itself become a source of instability if early military results disappoint.