Türkiye – A Sleeping Giant?
- Matt McKenzie
- Aug 1
- 7 min read

Key Takeaways
The growth of the Turkish defence sector will likely see the country become an increasingly critical partner, particularly in the UAV market, for militaries across the world.
Authoritarian practices have become increasingly widespread under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, posing increased safety risks for dissident political activists and journalists within Türkiye.
The demilitarisation of the PKK will likely reduce the risk of terrorist attacks within southeastern Türkiye, potentially attracting an increase in visitors and economic investment.
The production of Tayfun missiles and KAAN fighter jets demonstrates the extent to which Türkiye’s defence industry has become increasingly self-sufficient, allowing exports to new markets.
The Gulf states, Russia, and China may wish to manage the rise of Türkiye to varying extents to protect their strategic interests, meaning that trade or travel restrictions could be introduced in the medium to long term.
Türkiye may seek to expand its trade and defence partnerships within Europe, Central Asia, and the Sahel over the coming months to take advantage of its strategic position within the international community.
The Rise of Türkiye Explained
In a region increasingly defined by turmoil, Türkiye’s quiet rise has poised the country to become a future lynchpin of the Middle East. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has comprehensively consolidated his internal power base over the past several months, providing the country with the stability required to launch a global influence campaign extending to North Africa, Southeast Asia, and beyond. The influence spread through this campaign will have profound impacts for global businesses, many of whom may become increasingly reliant on Turkish supply chains, exports, and partners in the medium to long term.
The Construction of Erdoğan’s House of Cards
Arguably, the key to understanding Türkiye’s rise can be found in its internal politics, where two major developments have reshaped the nation’s power structures in recent weeks. Firstly, the disbanding of the PKK, announced by leader Abdullah Ocalan in mid-May 2025, will significantly reduce security tensions in Türkiye’s southern and eastern regions, allowing for an expansion of the central government’s presence in these previously unstable areas. Since the 1980s, the PKK waged an armed resistance campaign against the Turkish government in a bid to secure an independence state for the Kurdish ethnic group. This culminated in several terrorist attacks being conducted against Turkish embassies, military units, and civilian targets, many of which resulted in large numbers of casualties. Whilst pro-Kurdish sympathies for the PKK remain strong in rural areas of southeastern Türkiye, Ocalan’s decision to demilitarise means that these regions are nevertheless likely to witness a reduction in targeted violence against government personnel over the next several months. As such, interest from both foreign investors and domestic business leaders is likely to increase within these regions, creating new markets and trade routes through which goods and services can generate economic growth.
This notable development coincides with another initiative pursued by President Erdoğan. Namely, the weaponisation of the judiciary to arrest opposition politicians, activists, and journalists. Since the mid-2010s, President Erdoğan’s government style has shifted towards a notably more authoritarian model, with constitutional reforms, crackdowns against opposition, and electoral interference becoming normalised within the Turkish political system. However, over the past several weeks, Erdoğan’s attention has turned increasingly towards the removal of local politicians, particularly from the Republican People’s Party (CHP). This campaign aims to remove any candidate deemed capable of mounting a potential challenge to the incumbent AKP party, effectively purging the nation of formal opposition leaders.
The most notable of these examples was the arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, the popular mayor of Istanbul, on 19 March 2025: an event which prompted major protest action nationwide. İmamoğlu ‘s arrest, allegedly conducted due to forging his university degree, demonstrates how Erdogan’s control of the judiciary has been increasingly used to imprison leaders deemed to be building alternative bases of political support to the AKP. This was followed by a mass arrest campaign conducted on 01 July 2025, when the former mayor of Izmir was arrested alongside 109 municipal officials on corruption and misconduct charges. The arrests followed one day after the imprisonment of four LeMan magazine journalists for the publication of a political cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad, demonstrating President Erdoğan’s increasingly overt attempts to appeal to more conservative Islamist voter bases.
As such, the domestic political landscape of today’s Türkiye now appears unrecognisable from the one observed a decade ago. Grassroots activists, journalists, and political figures deemed critical of President Erdoğan or the AKP face a heightened risk of arrest by state authorities, who may also impose greater censorship restrictions against foreign businesses or tourists within Türkiye in the medium to long term.
Land, Air, and Sea: The Global Expansion of Turkish Defence Exports
Domestically, the benefits of internal consolidation remain obvious for President Erdogan, who appears likely to assume a mandate for lifetime rule over the next 1-2 years. This has translated into the adoption of more robust internal defence provisions, such as the “Steel Dome” initiative proposed at the beginning of 2025. This project will involve the development of an integrated radar and air defence system, constructed largely using Turkish suppliers and equipment, to enable rapid strategic decision-making and protection against incoming projectiles. However, this stability provided by this platform has also allowed Türkiye to embark on a major expansion of its global defence interests, providing both economic and strategic benefits for the country.
This has been facilitated largely by the growth of Türkiye’s domestic defence capabilities, which has seen the country become a leading exporter of equipment such as attack drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the past several years. At the International Defence Industry Fair (IDIF) 2025, Rokestan industries unveiled the Tayfun missile, the longest-range missile produced by a Turkish manufacturer to date. The Tayfun has a stated range of 500 to 800 kilometres, with future versions aiming to exceed 1,000 kilometres. The missile has been engineered for high precision, reportedly capable of striking targets within a margin of approximately five metres, including moving naval assets at sea. Meanwhile, on 26 July 2025, the export of 48 domestically produced KAAN fighter jets to Indonesia was agreed, highlighting the significant advancements which Türkiye’s defence sector has achieved in recent years. During the first half of 2025, Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports reached an estimated value of USD $3.6 billion, marking a 25% increase compared to the same period in 2024. This rapid growth highlights the extent to which Türkiye is likely to become a major global exporter of arms, particularly to comparatively “non-aligned” nations such as member states of the BRICS bloc.
Few countries illustrate the scale and impact of Türkiye’s defence ambitions more clearly than Syria. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024 has been largely attributed to Turkish support, which has fundamentally reshaped the region’s security landscape and provided a vital lifeline for post-war reconstruction. For Türkiye, a stable Syria remains critical in securing the country’s southern border against drug smugglers and human traffickers. During the Syrian civil war in the mid-2010s, millions of Syrian migrants transited and settled in Türkiye in a bid to secure asylum, whilst the state-sanctioned Captagon trade relied heavily on Turkish suppliers to facilitate exports to European markets. As such, Türkiye remains heavily invested in shaping Syrian security landscape to its advantage. Indeed, following the eruption of intercommunal violence between Bedouin and Druze militants in Suwayda, the Syrian government reportedly sought military assistance from Turkish authorities, highlighting the increasingly close defence partnership developing between the two countries.
The Giant Awakes: Strategic Implications for Africa, the Middle East, and Europe
The rise of Türkiye as a regional power will likely warrant mixed receptions from world leaders. Within the Middle East, Türkiye may begin to be seen as a rival power to the Gulf states who, have enjoyed a relative monopoly over regional influence since the conduction of Operation Rising Lion against their arch-rival Iran in June 2025. As Saudi Arabia remains eager to remain seen as the leader of the Muslim world, Türkiye’s ambitions may be viewed with a degree of scepticism and suspicion, particularly if they threaten stability in nations such as Syria or Iraq. Indeed, historical animosity between the Ottoman Empire and Arab states may also overshadow the ideological or religious similarities which the two sides share, placing a further strain on relations. However, these are highly unlikely to culminate in proxy wars or trade disputes due to the strong desire of both parties to facilitate greater trade and political stability within the region.
Within Africa, Türkiye appears eager to take advantage of the withdrawal of European and American influence, particularly in North Africa and the Sahel. Whilst Turkiye has provided continued support for the Sudanese and Libyan central governments since the outbreak of civil war in both countries, new activities in the Sahel suggest an expansion of the range of tactics Ankara is willing to use to secure defence influence abroad. Specifically, the Sadat private military corporation has allegedly been identified operating contracts in Burkina Faso and Niger, using Syrian mercenaries to provide security assistance to government forces. Reports suggest that Sadat, who offer military services in exchange for mineral concessions, have been identified assisting Russian units in protecting gold mines in Niger, indicating a limited degree of cooperation between the two countries. Whilst the use of Syrian mercenaries will likely be viewed as an unsustainable practice given the fall of the Assad regime, the deployment of Sadat operatives does suggest that Türkiye has increased its willingness to employ higher-risk tactics to secure both financial concessions and broader influence, which if successful, may be replicated in other African nations such as Mali and the Central African Republic, both of whom have struggled to contain anti-government insurgencies despite receiving assistance from Moscow.
Since the emergence of the war in Ukraine, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones have proven an instrumental tool in resisting Russian advances. Moreover, the withdrawal of American defence provisions has made European nations increasingly eager to diversify their defence partnerships, positioning Türkiye as an ideal supplier of equipment. Whilst many states, particularly in western Europe, retain serious concerns regarding the rollback of democratic and political freedoms within Türkiye, their desire to maintain current levels of support for Kyiv will likely allow Ankara to present itself as a key strategic partner, facilitating greater economic cooperation in the short to medium term.
Lastly, Türkiye’s historical, cultural, and linguistic connections to Central Asia may inspire defence contractors to targets countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as potential export destinations moving forward. Given the erosion of Russia’s historic trade dominance and the alarm bells posed by Chinese influence, Türkiye may be able to present itself as a catalyst for defence diversification, facilitating an increase in trade and defence cooperation between Ankara and Central Asia. With Türkiye’s rise now well underway, the world waits to observe its impacts.
For further information on how the rise of Türkiye may impact your travel or business operations, please contact Global Situational Awareness at https://www.globalsitu.com/.