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Afghanistan: The Taliban - From International Pariah to Russian Ally?

  • Paul Ainscough
  • May 4
  • 5 min read

Updated: 5 days ago

The Taliban: From International Pariah to Russian Ally?


Key takeaways:


  • While Russia’s Supreme Court decision alone may not be transformative, it signals a broader shift in Moscow’s engagement strategy toward the Taliban.

  • Although the Taliban’s appalling human rights record limits its global legitimacy, some countries with strategic interests, such as Russia, China, and Pakistan, have demonstrated a willingness to engage. Improving relations between Moscow and the Taliban are driven by realpolitik considerations on both sides.

  • An enhanced Russian-Taliban relationship could influence the dynamics of Central Asia, with potential repercussions for security, power balances, and companies operating in the region.


The Taliban’s Struggle for Recognition


Since the United States' (US) disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban has remained largely isolated from the international community. The group’s unwillingness to form an inclusive government, reputation for minority and women’s rights abuses, as well as ties to terrorism, have made recognition and engagement unpalatable for most governments. Despite UN Secretary General António Guterres convening a two-day meeting of regional and special envoys for Afghanistan in February 2025, a lack of consensus remains over how to engage with the Taliban.


Notwithstanding the Taliban’s difficulties in increasing engagement with the international community, countries including Russia, China, Iran, and Pakistan have demonstrated an openness to engage with the group. While neighbouring countries tend to view engagement as a “necessary evil” to address core concerns, regional powers are largely motivated by strategic interests. The most striking recent development came on 17 April 2025, when Russia’s Supreme Court formally removed the Taliban’s designation as a “terrorist organisation”. According to the Kremlin’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, the move paves the way for establishing formal diplomatic relations. The decision marks the latest chapter in a broader trend that, considering the historical context, signals a striking shift in relations between the two.


A Brief History: Russia’s Realisation of Realpolitik


Back in 1994, the Taliban was formed by former Mujahideen soldiers, many of whom fought against the Soviet Union during its catastrophic invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Relations remained strained throughout the 1990s, largely due to the Taliban’s recognition of Chechnya’s independence and its support for anti-Russian militants. Then, as the War on Terror began in the aftermath of 9/11, the Taliban, having provided sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, became a global pariah. In addition to voicing its support for the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow formally designated the Taliban a terrorist organisation in 2003, citing the group’s support for separatists in the North Caucasus.


Despite years of poor relations, deteriorating ties between Russia and the West set the stage for a strategic reset between Moscow and the Taliban. From the Russian perspective,  a rapprochement served several strategic purposes. These included improving Moscow’s foothold in Central Asia (an important front in Russia’s sphere of influence), countering NATO expansion, and curbing the ongoing threat presented by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK), a regional branch of Islamic State (ISIS). The toppling of former Russian ally and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 has created further impetus for Russia to seek new international partners. Concerning the Taliban’s motivations, reconciling with Russia would reduce the group’s political isolation and potentially create economic opportunities. Considering the numerous challenges facing Afghanistan’s economy, such as the recent suspension of US humanitarian aid, currency instability, and trade disruptions, the Taliban has strong incentives to diversify its foreign partnerships and engagement with Russia offers a potential lifeline.


While many countries withdrew their embassies following the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in August 2021, Russia opted to keep its embassy open in Kabul. This was followed by accrediting a Taliban diplomat in March 2022, allowing a Taliban delegation to attend Russia’s economic forum in Saint Petersburg in June 2022, and the signing of provisional trade agreements in September 2022. Additionally, in October 2024, a meeting was held between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Taliban counterpart, Amir Khan Muttaqi.


The Broader Implications


Although the court ruling does not amount to formal recognition, it carries symbolic weight by illustrating the broader shift in international attitudes. If the court ruling proves to be a stepping stone from which a successful working relationship develops, the rapprochement could have considerable geopolitical implications. Although the White House currently has greater foreign policy priorities, Russia’s growing foothold in Central Asia would add to an already complex landscape regarding great power competition.


Economically, improving bilateral ties could unlock a new trade corridor to South Asia and potentially open the door for Moscow to tap into Afghanistan’s abundance of critical minerals, estimated to be worth roughly $1 trillion. The fact that the Russian Business Centre in Afghanistan offered to launch a detailed survey of Afghanistan’s mineral resources to support their extraction in December 2024 lends further credibility to this. While the Taliban will be tempted, the group will have to tread carefully to avoid being exploited by Russia in a similar arrangement to that present in the Sahel’s most vulnerable countries.


For the Taliban, resetting relations with a major power will not fix all of its problems. Normalising ties with Moscow could prompt other countries to follow suit, advancing the Taliban’s efforts to gain broader international recognition and relief from economic sanctions. However, without a significant shift in governance, it is difficult to envision the regime achieving recognition beyond its neighbourhood in the short term. In all likelihood, the ideological gulf with Western countries will prove insurmountable. Despite these harsh realities, both Russia and the Taliban continue to see cooperation as a means to advance shared objectives, such as countering terrorism. In July 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin labelled the Taliban as "allies in the fight against terrorism".


While this statement is ironic given the widespread international recognition of the Taliban as a terrorist organisation, the pair share an interest in combating ISK. The group has carried out deadly attacks in both Afghanistan and Russia, including the March 2024 concert hall attack in Moscow that killed 145 people. Analysts remain sceptical that a more robust partnership will reduce the terror threat. With ISK already utilising Kabul’s international outreach as propaganda material, the rapprochement risks further emboldening the group. Considering that the Taliban only actively fights ISK, while actively supporting other groups such as al-Qaeda, the group’s counterterrorism objective appears to be control rather than eradication.


Risk Forecast


For many companies operating in the broader region, the prospect of greater Russian influence will be unwelcome. With terrorism continuing to pose a threat, companies operating in Central Asia face an ongoing threat to their infrastructure. Instability in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s limited ability to contain ISK could easily lead to cross-border attacks or unrest in other Central Asian states. Targeting oil and gas infrastructure could cause significant economic damage and supply chain disruption. Western companies such as Chevron and Exxon Mobil are particularly vulnerable due to their US origins. Growing Russian leverage in Central Asia could also pressure local partners or regulators to prioritise Russian interests, disadvantaging foreign businesses. With pervasive uncertainty, companies must remain updated on the evolving situation and seek tailored geopolitical advice to insulate themselves from the risks.


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