Global SA – Special Report – What to Expect at the Upcoming 52nd G7 Summit in France

Key takeaways:

• The 52nd G7 Summit, hosted by France in June 2026, will convene leaders from major advanced democracies alongside invited guest nations to address global economic and security priorities.

• Critics argue the G7's relevance is declining due to its shrinking share of global wealth, the exclusion of major economic powers such as China and India, as well as severe internal political divisions.

• The G7 remains a relevant, minilateral forum capable of defending the liberal international order and its values at a time when it is under threat. It serves as an alternative to larger, often gridlocked global institutions, providing an informal structure for diplomacy.

• To protect G7 unity and avoid direct confrontation with the Trump administration, France has compromised on its agenda by omitting climate change.

• The bloc will focus heavily on the Middle East, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and reinforcing security commitments to Ukraine. With the US-China trade war exposing the West’s vulnerability concerning critical minerals, reducing Beijing’s domination on the supply chain is also likely to arise.

The role of the G7

The 52nd G7 Summit is set to be held between 15 and 17 June 2026 in Évian-les-Bains, Haute-Savoie, France, roughly 41km northeast of Geneva. G7 summits are held annually, gathering the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). It brings together advanced democratic economies to address a range of global challenges. As an informal forum, inviting other countries as guest nations has become a standard practice in recent decades. The upcoming summit will also be attended by major emerging countries, including Kenya and India, with South Korea and Brazil also being invited, although they have not yet confirmed their attendance. 

The G7 was formed in 1975 by the most advanced and industrialised economies at the time to coordinate their response to various issues. While it is neither an international organisation nor a formal decision-making forum, it remains an arena for political influence, capable of shaping economic, financial, and development priorities on a global scale. Historically, key areas of cooperation have included global economic stability, international peace, security, and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI). The G7 has been responsible for a number of initiatives, including the Financial Action Task Force, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Deauville Partnership (launched after the Arab Spring), the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the Muskoka Initiative to reduce maternal and infant mortality.

The G7’s declining influence and navigating challenges

While there is no shortage of global challenges for multilateral organisations such as the G7 to address, some commentators contend that the group’s relevance for tackling such matters has notably declined. One key argument centres on the group’s diminishing economic influence relative to the rest of the world. For instance, the G7’s economic aggregate, which accounted for more than 60% of the world’s total in the 1970s, has dropped to 26%, while that of emerging economies has increased. Despite this, rising economic powers, such as China and India (the world’s second and fourth largest economies), remain outside the group. For many, this points towards the G7 failing to keep pace as the global distribution of wealth and power shifts from West to East and North to South.

Considering the G7’s omission of several major economic powers, critics have unsurprisingly pointed to the group as more of an ideological alignment aimed at representing the interests of developed Western nations within the liberal international order (LIO). This has been used by some as justification to forward the argument that the G7 is insufficient for determining the direction of the world economy. This stance is especially common in countries that do not share the same democratic, liberal values. Additionally, the fact that the US, the G7’s most important member, does not currently embody many of the principles ostensibly underpinning the bloc serves as an illustration of the group’s internal political fragility. This was laid particularly bare in 2025 amid US President Donald Trump’s threats to make the host nation Canada the 51st state. In its current form, deep internal divisions are significantly hindering the G7 from fully executing its role.

Can the G7 still play a role?

While it is difficult to refute the arguments regarding the G7’s role, it would be erroneous to maintain the bloc to be obsolete. At a time when the liberal, rules-based international order is heavily threatened amid heightened geopolitical tensions and competition, the forum can still perform a diplomatic role by countering global instability, as well as upholding rules and norms. If the LIO is to adapt and survive, bringing together these countries, which will inevitably play a crucial role, remains important. Additionally, through strategically coordinating responses to matters of shared interests, members can respond more effectively to the world’s most pressing challenges.

The forum’s informal structure, which relies on a small number of nations and several guest states, can also be considered a strength. With significant geopolitical divisions regularly preventing larger formal bodies, including the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organisation, from taking action, smaller, minilateral groups are becoming increasingly favoured diplomatic vessels of choice. Examples of similar blocs include BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey), among others. While it is true that some matters, such as climate change, require a comprehensive dialogue between many nations, including between those suspicious or opposed to one another, forums such as the G20 can serve such purposes.

What’s on the agenda?

In 2026, the G7 summit will be held against a backdrop marked by conflict, ongoing geopolitical tensions, persistent macroeconomic imbalances, and an increase in financing needs for sustainable development and the fight against climate change. With disagreements on certain subjects between member states, France has been forced to decide whether to follow a similar path to the previous host Canada in identifying a limited set of issues on which the US is sufficiently open to ensure there is scope for consensus. As it transpired, Paris has adopted a similar strategy to Ottawa by narrowing the agenda to avoid direct confrontation with the US. The most notable illustration of this was the omission of climate change, with French Ecology Minister Monique Barbut acknowledging that Washington’s “positions on this subject are well known”. With the Trump administration having withdrawn the US from the Paris Agreement on climate change, it is hoped that by avoiding such debates, the summit can “prioritise G7 unity”. Environmental activist groups have unsurprisingly been critical of the decision to leave climate off the agenda.

With a tenuous ceasefire in the Middle East and the ongoing war in Ukraine, conflict and defence are likely to feature heavily. With Trump heavily criticising several G7 partners over their lack of support for the war on Iran, it remains unclear to what extent he will buy into the process. There is also no certainty regarding what state the conflict will be in, which at the time of writing, has been paused by a ceasefire described by Trump as “on life support”. Another escalation, a permanent peace agreement, an exit with no deal, and more of the same ambiguity all remain possible at the time of the next summit. While Trump could use the forum as a vessel through which to amplify his agenda regarding Iran and criticise the inaction of Washington’s G7 allies, it is highly probable that other members will repeat their calls for a lasting peace and a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Any hostility on the matter from Trump is likely to threaten the reputation of the organisation and detract from what the other leaders hope to achieve.

With the world grappling with the energy crisis triggered by the closure of the Strait, energy security is also set to arise; the French G7 presidency has requested support from the International Energy Association (IEA) on the matter. Additionally, with France being a global leader in nuclear energy and the world’s second largest producer of nuclear energy, French President Emmanuel Macron may use the summit to push its adoption. This would seek to build upon the Nuclear Energy Summit held in Paris in March 2026, which brought together global leaders and representatives from more than 60 countries.

Regarding the war in Ukraine, with the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada all being members of the Coalition of the Willing, such nations are likely to reaffirm their commitment to a multinational peacekeeping force. For reference, the Coalition is an international alliance formed in March 2025 with the objective of guaranteeing Ukraine’s long-term security. G7 members may also reiterate their support for the US-led peace process, while insisting that any agreement does not include terms that favour Russia. With the European Union (EU) formalising a €90 billion loan for Ukraine after Hungary withdrew its veto, financing discussions may also arise. Additional topics of discussion may include targeting the Russian shadow fleet with new sanctions, the impacts of Moscow’s hybrid warfare campaign, rebuilding Ukraine’s power grid ahead of winter, and the country’s reconstruction after the war. While Russian President Vladimir Putin recently signalling that his war with Ukraine may be “coming to an end” after more than four years of fighting, there is plenty of justification for caution when it comes to drawing conclusions regarding his intentions.

On the theme of commodities, critical minerals are likely to be a prominent issue up for discussion. The importance of such resources, which are essential for renewable technology and sophisticated military hardware, have been well documented. However, it was the US-China trade war that particularly underscored the extent of Western vulnerability as a result of China’s dominance of the critical minerals supply chain, from extraction and refining to manufacturing. Beijing produces approximately 90% of the world’s rare earths. When Trump hiked tariffs on China to 54% in April 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping retaliated with export restrictions on rare earth elements, including mined minerals, permanent magnets, and other finished products. Seven categories of medium and heavy rare earths, including samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium-related items, were placed on an export control list. With severe supply disruptions forcing some US automotive and defence plants to halt production, Trump was forced to strike an agreement that saw the US lower its tariffs by 10% in exchange for Beijing suspending export controls. While the agreement alleviated the immediate threat posed by the export curbs, the potential for China to leverage its dominant position remains a concern.

The G7 are reportedly in talks to establish a permanent secretariat to ensure initiatives to increase critical mineral supplies survive beyond the bloc's rotating presidencies. Additionally, in April 2026, the US and EU agreed to deepen their coordination on the matter given the strategic implications of failing to do so. Although finding alternative sources, expanding refining capacities, and boosting stockpiles is destined to be a gradual process, it remains worthwhile considering that alleviating the reliance on China is as critical as the minerals themselves.

In addition to potential discussions surrounding the economic impacts of great power strategic competition, there will be a strong emphasis on identifying and correcting the imbalances threatening the global economy. These include predatory competition, industrial overcapacities, underinvestment, excessive debt, deregulation, a decline in international solidarity, and low private investment in developing countries, among other issues. During an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2025, Macron signalled his top priorities, including global imbalances, addressing US trade imbalances without tariffs, leveraging Chinese manufacturing capacities without compromising the environment, and returning to a spirit of cooperation. There has also been a stated intention to reform the traditional system of development aid through international partnerships and organisations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Solutions include channelling funds to those who most need it through less fragmented aid, attracting more private capital, enhancing the complementarity of public and private financing, as well as reforming key financial and economic institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Business implications – winners, losers, and strategic pivots

The key takeaways regarding business implications stemming from the upcoming G7 summit will present themselves more clearly once the summit has concluded. The G7 traditionally announces its agreed measures and policy measures immediately upon the conclusion of the summit. With climate action intentionally being excluded from the agenda, it would be fair to assume that the green technology sector is unlikely to benefit from this year’s forum. The focus on critical minerals is likely to substantially benefit exploration, mining, processing, refining, and recycling firms. As the G7 is unable to secure critical minerals without cooperation with the countries where they are located, local firms in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia are poised to benefit. This has been demonstrated by the launch of the Resilient and Inclusive Supply Chain Enhancement (RISE) Partnership in October 2023. Additionally, with the summit being heavily shaped by conflict and geopolitical tensions, procurement contracts for defence and aerospace companies are likely to proliferate.