Georgia: The Next Member of Europe’s Antidemocratic Alliance?

Key Takeaways:

• The Georgia Dream party has undergone a significant transformation over the past several years, now operating under openly authoritarian practices.

• Georgian nationals, particularly those engaged in pro-democracy activist movements or opposition politics, face an elevated risk of harassment and violence from members of the Georgian security services both at home and abroad.

• Personnel are advised to avoid criticising Georgia Dream policies or officials when travelling to Georgia due to the increased risk of legal repercussions.

• The formation of an anti-democratic political bloc including Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, and Georgia is assessed as likely to occur. This will likely increase polarisation within European politics and provide Russia with greater scope to stage influence and sabotage operations against European targets.

The Death of a Dream: The Transformation of the Georgia Dream Party

The Georgia Dream party, the dominant force in Georgian politics since 2012, has undergone a radical transformation over the past 13 years. Initially a member of the Party of European Socialists (PES), Georgia Dream has gradually embraced more socially conservative, populist, and Eurosceptic positions. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and honorary chairman of Georgia Dream, has been largely responsible for this antidemocratic shift. In recent years, the billionaire has promoted conspiracy theories including the “Global War Party” theory, which accuses western leaders of attempting to drag Georgia into a war against Russia.

Initially, these sentiments found expression only in the rhetoric espoused by more populist members of the party. However, since 2023, they have translated into increasingly draconian legislation. Notoriously, in May 2024, a law was passed requiring any NGO receiving more than 20% of its funding from foreign donors to register as an organisation "bearing the interests of a foreign power".  The Transparency of Foreign Influence law, which is widely believed to be modelled on a similar law implemented by Russian authorities in 2022, carries an initial financial penalty of USD $9,600 followed by a monthly fine of roughly USD $7,000.

This law, in addition to other concerns regarding media restrictions and corruption, prompted mass protest action to erupt in Tbilisi. During the spring and summer of 2024, as many as 200,000 protesters gathered to protest the Transparency of Foreign Influence law and to demand commitments regarding the pursual of European Union membership: a policy which until only recently was championed by Georgia Dream. These protests witnessed violence between demonstrators and law enforcement authorities, resulting in multiple injuries.

However, the re-election of Georgia Dream on 26 October 2024 turbocharged both opposition against the party and the willingness of party officials to engage in authoritarian practices. Official election results gave Georgian Dream a 54 per cent majority, in contrast with independent exit polls which gave the opposition a 10 per cent lead. This discrepancy contributed to widespread suspicion regarding manipulation and interference, particularly by Russian authorise. Shortly after their victory, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated that Georgia will suspend talks on European Union accession for 4 years whilst accusing Brussels of “blackmail”. These factors sparked further protest action, resulting in over 224 arrests. Much of this was spearheaded by former Georgia Dream president Salome Zourabichvili, whose pro-EU and pro-West agenda saw her split from party leaders.

The Nightmare Begins: Authoritarianism under Georgia Dream

Since their 2024 re-election, Georgia Dream’s style of government has shifted from flawed democracy to outward authoritarianism. The suppression of independent media outlets, weaponisation of the judiciary against political opponents, and orchestration of violent attacks against pro-democracy activists have all been witnessed in recent month, as demonstrated by the following examples.

Between 11-12 January 2025, more than 20 people including activists, media workers, and members of the political opposition were arrested in Tbilisi and Batumi during protests held in solidarity with previously detained pro-European demonstrators. Some, including activists Tsiala Katamidze and Mate Tsentradze, were detained in Batumi under a newly enacted law prohibiting the placement of protest stickers on public buildings. Mzia Amaghlobeli, founder of the independent media outlets Batumelebi and Netgazeti, was arrested twice on 12 January 2025. Initially detained for the administrative offence of posting a protest sticker, she was later re-arrested as a criminal suspect, with the charges against her yet to be disclosed. Human rights defender Gia Jvarsheishvili, who previously reported being tortured during detention in December 2025, was also re-arrested on 11 January 2025 and later hospitalised.

On 27 May 2025, it was revealed that Giorgi Bachiashvili, a former financial adviser to Georgia Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili and former head of the Co-Investment Fund, was arrested by Georgia’s State Security Service (SSG) near the Georgian-Armenian border on politically motivated charges of embezzling up to USD $42 million. Bachiashvili’s international legal team claims that he was forcibly returned to Georgia and that his arrest was motivated by personal revenge from Bidzina Ivanishvili. Prosecutors accused Bachiashvili of stealing cryptocurrency worth up to USD $40 million in 2023, prompting him to flee the country on 02 March 2025. After being discovered, Bachiashvili was sentenced to 11 years in prison by Tbilisi City Court after being found guilty of large-scale embezzlement and money laundering.

On 06 June 2025, Georgian Dream announced that it will sue social media users over insults directed towards party representatives. The ruling party’s decision was announced by Irakli Kirtskhalia, deputy chair of Georgian Dream’s parliamentary faction, following claims that his colleagues were being targeted by an “organised campaign of hatred and terror” led by the “radical opposition and extremist groups under their control”.

In early February 2025, several amendments to Georgia’s administrative and criminal codes were passed, imposing harsh penalties for offenses such as “insulting officials” and blocking the road during protests. Suspects found guilty of under the new law can be fined up to USD $1,000 or placed under administrative arrest for up to 45 days. Between 23 May and 06 June 2025, 6 activists were penalised under this article. This included the jailing of Zurab Japaridze and Nika Melia, both of whom are prominent opposition political figures from the pro-Western Coalition for Change. Meanwhile, in Tbilisi, 2 individuals were sentenced to 12 days of administrative detention for allegedly insulting Georgia Dream MP Mariam Lashkhi, while another was jailed for 10 days for allegedly insulting MP Tea Tsulukiani.

On 05 February 2025, Georgia Dream voted to strip 49 opposition deputies of their mandates for having refused to take up their seats in protest against electoral violations. The vote effectively brings the total number of Georgian parliamentarians down to 89 from the 150 elected in the disputed parliamentary elections, the vast majority of whom now sit under the Georgian Dream party banner. 

During the evening hours (local) of 07 June 2025, the husband of an opposition political leader was abducted by state authorities in connection with a video released in 2018.  Reportedly, the husband of United National Movement (UNM) chairwoman Tina Bokuchava was abducted by 5 masked individuals due to publishing a video speculating on the sexuality of Uta Ivanishvili, the son of Bidzina Ivanishvili.  The victim was blindfolded, forced into a car, and detained in an unknown building for 8 hours. During the ordeal, the suspects threatened to harm the couple's children and demonstrated intimate knowledge of the victim's daily walking patterns. The following day, the victim released an apology video in accordance with the suspects' demands.

Combined, these incidents illustrate an unmistakeable trend. Namely, the Georgia Dream party’s open willingness to weaponise the judiciary, security services, and media to persecute individuals deemed enemies of the state. Whilst for now, this weaponisation is focussed primarily against high-profile opposition political figures and personal adversaries of Bidzina Ivanishvili, this may soon extend to citizens deemed even partially critical of Georgia Dream policies. Reforms to social media legislation make this scenario especially likely, and mark a near total restriction of independent media outlets.

The Power of Four: Future Alignment with Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia

Having shattered the short-term possibility of alignment between Georgia and the European Union, officials in Brussels will likely have watched Georgia Dream’s transformation in horror. Meanwhile, leaders in Slovakia, Hungary, and Serbia have watched these developments with interest, with many implementing similar practices to varying degrees of success in their own countries. Already, these countries have offered tentative political and economic support to Georgia Dream, a trend which is highly likely to increase over the coming months. This has made the emergence of an anti-democratic bloc encompassing Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, and Georgia increasingly probable: a development which would have significant implications for domestic and regional security.  

Following the country’s legislative elections, during which European officials issued warnings regarding serious irregularities and possible vote rigging, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán visited Georgia on 30 October 2024 to meet with Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze. This was widely perceived as an attempt to lend legitimacy to the Georgian government and to undermine European efforts to demand greater transparency and electoral reforms from Georgia Dream.

On 16 December 2024, Slovakia’s Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár opposed "hasty sanctions or interference" in the Georgian election results, criticising European Parliament for politicising the situation and pro-EU President Salome Zurabishvili’s refusal to step down. Foreign Minister Blanár spoke at a press conference after the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), where his country and Hungary vetoed sanctions against Georgian representatives. Specifically, Hungary and Slovakia vetoed a proposal to impose EU sanctions against Georgian officials in response to the government’s harsh crackdown on protesters.

From 15 June 2025 onwards, direct flights will be launched between Serbia and Georgia following the signature of several bilateral agreements. Specifically, the two countries signed an Air Service Agreement along with an accompanying Memorandum of Understanding between their respective civil aviation authorities. The bilateral agreement defines the legal basis for the operation of regular international air traffic, while the Memorandum of Understanding enables direct cooperation between the two aviation authorities in technical, regulatory and safety matters. There are no restrictions on frequencies or destinations within the new agreement.

The notable similarities between the governments of Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, and Georgia make such cooperation initiatives logical. Namely, each have expressed varying degrees of scepticism towards the western-led international order, a desire to protect ordinary citizens from “deep state elites”, and initiated campaigns to manipulate the judiciary, security apparatus, and media landscape to their advantage. Moreover, the prolonged nature of the conflict in Ukraine has seen many blame the West for the re-emergence of war on the European continent, fostering either neutral or positive political sentiments towards Russia. Meanwhile, the re-election of Donald Trump in the United States has empowered the championing of isolationism, executive rule, and moral relativism: all ideologies which align with those practiced by members of the antidemocratic bloc.

This will likely present renewed opportunities for Russia to influence European affairs, potentially using countries within the antidemocratic bloc as launchpads for sabotage operations, hubs for intelligence gathering, or opportunities for limited economic or political cooperation. This elevates the likelihood of sabotage attacks being staged against western European targets, particularly in countries who have provided significant military or financial support to Ukraine over the past 2 years.

More broadly, Russia will likely support efforts to bolster cooperation between members of the emerging bloc, providing them with an increasing ability to worsen the split between anti-immigration isolationists and centrist federalists currently underway within European politics. This strategy aims to destabilise European politics to the extent where civil unrest, state interference, or democratic processes result in the election of more isolationist governments. Georgia Dream’s transformation demonstrates that this tactic has evidently yielded immense success in Georgia, and serve as a template be replicated in other European countries moving forward.